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Abstract 
Generally, the purpose of defense research and development (R&D) is to expand 
military capability for the armed forces of a country.  Any spin-off of technologies from 
defense R&D programs is usually not a prime motivation but more often an unintended 
consequence.  Nevertheless, many of the technologies used in civilian life were initially 
research and development projects for military purposes.  These technologies eventually 
become adapted to civilian applications since they had beneficial economic and social 
''spillover'' effects.  However, there is a lack of research measuring the final outputs of 
defense R&D, including technology ''spin-offs.'' 
This study mainly tried to understand the effect of defense R&D expenditures on 
military capability and technological spillover.  Statistical measures such as correlations 
were used to understand these effects.  The study revealed that there is a highly positive 
correlation between defense R&D expenditure and military capability, as well as between 
defense R&D expenditure and technological spillover index.  
The study contributed to the academic literature in three ways by providing: new 
measures of military capability, a new estimation method for defense R&D expenditures, 
and a new method to measure technological spillover effect from defense R&D 
expenditures.  
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THE EFFECT OF DEFENSE R&D EXPENDITURES ON MILITARY 
CAPABILITY AND TECHNOLOGICAL SPILLOVER 
 
''When we start outsourcing everything and we are in that kind of a trade deficit, then just 
remember, who feeds us, who fuels us and who helps us to fight, that's to whom we are 
enslaved.  So if we cannot do those three things, our national security is very much at 
risk.'' 
  Mike Huckabee (U.S. Presidential Candidate, 2008)  
(Hoffman, 2008, para. 4) 
 
I. Introduction 
 In developing countries such as Turkey, Research and Development (R&D) is 
widely discussed in a commercial or industrial context, but rarely in a military context.  
This is unfortunate because many of the technologies used in civilian life were initially 
military research and development projects that eventually become adapted to civilian 
applications.  In fact, military R&D often has beneficial economic and social ''spillover'' 
or ''spin-off'' effects (Dunne & Braddon, 2008; Hartley, 2011).  For example, Light 
Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation (LASER), the Global Positioning 
System (GPS), and even the Internet are three well-known innovations that were 
originally derived from military R&D efforts.  These and many other technological 
innovations would have not been possible without military R&D efforts.  
Background 
 Defense R&D (also referred to as military R&D or defense-related R&D) 
expenditures are an important source of information about a nation's military 
technological capability and its commitment to a national defense industrial base 
(Hartley, 2006).  To understand defense R&D, it is important to define the term and then 
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examine defense R&D in the context of R&D in general.  According to the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Frascati Manual, research and 
development (R&D) is defined as ''creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in 
order to increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of man, culture and 
society, and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new applications'' (OECD, 
2002:30).  In the same vein, Thee (1990) defines defense R&D as a ''mission-oriented 
R&D activity comprising basic and applied research, with the development, testing and 
experimental production of new weapons and weapons systems, including the 
improvement and modernization of existing weapons and weapons systems.'' 
 The Frascati Manual describes the most popular methodology for collecting and 
reporting statistics related to research and development data used by academic 
researchers and military analysts (Motte, 1992).  The Frascati Manual groups R&D 
activities into two primary approaches, which are institutional and functional.  The 
institutional approach, often called sectoring, categorizes R&D activities by funding 
source, and the functional approach categorizes R&D activities by their objective.  
Funding sources for R&D activities include government, higher education, business 
enterprise, and private non-profit enterprises.  The functional approach breaks down 
R&D activities into types of R&D (basic research, applied research, and experimental 
development), product fields, fields of science and technology (natural sciences, 
engineering and technology, medical sciences, agricultural sciences, social sciences, 
humanities), and socio-economic objectives (defense, and control and care of 
environment) (OECD, 2002).  Figure 1 shows the decision tree for sectoring R&D units 
and Figure 2 shows the functional breakdown of R&D activities.  Institutionally, defense 
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R&D comes from either government or business enterprise sectors.  Functionally, it 
serves the socio-economic objective. 
 
Figure 1.  Decision Tree for Sectoring R&D Units (Note: Reproduced from OECD, 
2002:55) 
 
 
Figure 2.  Functional Breakdown of R&D Activities (Note: Adapted from OECD, 
2002:77-88) 
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 Funding their own defense R&D as part of their military or defense budgets is one 
of the ways that countries develop science and technology to improve their warfighting 
capability.  In this way, some nations are able to develop both their military capability 
and their industrial infrastructure simultaneously, thus becoming technology exporters.  
However, nations that do not fund their own defense R&D may be at a distinct military 
and industrial infrastructure disadvantage.  Such countries tend to become technology 
importers.  There is inherent risk to technology-importing countries when their 
relationships with technology-exporting countries change.  The problem occurs when 
technology-exporting nations force their customers into long-term dependent 
relationships requiring the use of proprietary parts and maintenance procedures.  When 
the relationship sours, the technology-exporting nation can simply withhold supplies, 
which slowly weakens the dependent nation's military capability.  For instance, after 
Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in 1974, the United States (U.S.) imposed an arms 
embargo against Turkey (Turkey's armed forces were supported by American weapon 
systems, parts, and supplies) (Kurtoglu & Agdemir, 2001).  
 Of course, technology-exporting nations with large armed forces are in the best 
position to engage in advanced weapons manufacturing due to economies of scale and 
large budgets.  Hence, they are in the best position to export weapons and exert implicit 
pressure by doing so.  Although smaller nations may not be able to become technology or 
weapons exporters, they may still benefit from funding their own defense R&D.  For 
example, they may gain a proprietary technological/military advantage.  Additionally, 
internal defense R&D expenditures may result in positive socio-economic spillover 
effects such as patents. 
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Problem and Purpose Statement 
 All nations must determine what proportion of their defense budgets will be spent 
on defense R&D and what proportion will be spent on weapons procurement.  The largest 
nations, like the United States and China, are able to expend large sums on both (see 
Table 1).  The smallest nations, by necessity, focus on weapons procurement.  Mid-sized 
nations face a funding dilemma: to invest in defense R&D or to outsource it.  Many 
nations prefer to purchase military equipment and material from technology-producing 
countries without funding their own defense R&D.  This allows the country to maximize 
its military capability and strength, at least in the short run.  For instance, Saudi Arabia 
purchases most of its military equipment from its allies such as the U.S. (Quandt, 1981).  
However, without its own R&D program, Saudi Arabia and countries like it face the 
aforementioned risks associated with this strategy.  
Table 1   
Defense and Defense R&D Expenditures 
Defense and Defense R&D Exp.  The United States China 
Rest of the 
World 
Total Defense 
Budget (2011)* 
$ B $690 B $130 B $769 B 
% of the world 43% 8% 48% 
Total Defense 
R&D Budget** 
$ B $ 83 B $ 15 B $ 22 B 
% of the world 69% 12.5% 18% 
Defense R&D as 
a Proportion of 
Defense Budget 
% 12% 11.5% 3%*** 
* Source: (Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI), 2012) 
** Estimates in the study are used. 
*** Calculation does not include countries that do not invest in defense R&D.  
 
 Since the expenditure on defense R&D also has potential ''spillover'' effects (e.g. 
economical, technological, social, etc.), countries should consider these effects when 
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making funding choices.  However, there is a lack of available measures of final outputs 
of defense R&D, including technology ''spin-offs'' (Hartley, 2011).  The main purpose of 
this study was to understand the effect of defense R&D expenditures on military 
capability.  This study also attempted to address spillover and spin-off effects of defense 
R&D.  Note: The researcher uses Turkey as a representative mid-sized country facing the 
internal defense R&D expenditure dilemma in many of the tables. 
Research Questions 
 To address these purposes, this study attempted to answer the following research 
questions.  
 1. How can defense R&D expenditure data be estimated when countries choose    
     not to reveal it? 
 
 2. What are the currently available measures of military capability?  Could other    
     measures be developed?  Are military capability measures consistent? 
 
 3. What is the effect of defense R&D expenditures on military capability? 
 4. What are the effects of defense R&D expenditures beyond military capability? 
Methodology 
 The research methodology consists of quantitative research elements.  The 
approach began with a literature review to investigate key concepts and existing data.  
The second step was to determine how to estimate defense R&D data when many 
countries choose not to reveal it.  The next step was to calculate measures for military 
capability and spillover effects.  The overall study ended with the presentation of the 
results, including new methods of estimating defense R&D.  Additional details on the 
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data collection and estimation approach and data analysis techniques are presented in 
Chapter III. 
Summary 
 This chapter introduced the overall topic by presenting background information, 
the problem, research questions, and a summary of the methodology employed in this 
study.  Chapter II presents a detailed literature review of defense R&D, defense R&D 
data analysis, military capability measurement, and the spillover effects of defense R&D.  
Chapter III provides a full description of the methodology, including the dataset 
collection, estimation, and analysis approaches.  Chapter IV illustrates the results of the 
study and delineates the analysis of data and findings.  Finally, Chapter V provides the 
resulting conclusions for the study and outlines recommendations for further research.  
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II. Literature Review 
 This chapter starts with the definition of defense research and development 
(R&D) and then describes difficulties associated with collecting and analyzing defense 
R&D data.  Next, various measurements of national and military capability are 
introduced.  The literature review ends with an analysis of the spillover effects of defense 
R&D and their interrelationship with civil R&D. 
Defense R&D Definition 
 While it is clear that defense R&D contributes to the total defense capability of a 
nation (Hartley, 2011; Braddon, 1999; Anderson, 2006; Dunne & Braddon, 2008), no 
consensus has emerged as to its proper measure and the mechanism of its influence 
(Hartley, 2011; Dunne & Braddon, 2008).  While the basic definition of defense R&D is 
relatively straightforward, in practice it becomes difficult to separate specific budgetary 
line items.  Thee (1990) defines defense R&D as ''a mission-oriented R&D activity 
comprising basic and applied research, with the development, testing and experimental 
production of new weapons and weapons systems, including the improvement and 
modernization of existing weapons and weapons systems.''  Similarly, Motte (1992) 
defines defense R&D as ''the expenditure on research and development that is absorbed 
by the military as opposed to the civil sector of the economy.'' 
 While overall R&D expenditure is divided into civilian and defense sectors, some 
R&D expenditures can be described as ''dual-use.''  The deciding factor for categorization 
is the primary purpose of the expenditure.  For example, nuclear and space R&D (if 
primarily for defense purposes) are defense R&D; however, meteorology or 
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telecommunications R&D (if primarily used for civil purposes) are civilian R&D (OECD, 
2002).  As another example, countries with large nuclear R&D programs, such as France, 
divide the expenditure between the civilian (power plants) and the defense (weapons) 
sectors (Brzoska, 2005).  Finally, enterprise-financed R&D, whose main purpose is 
defense, should also be assessed under the defense R&D umbrella (OECD, 2002).  
Defense R&D Data 
 Accurate and complete defense R&D data are difficult to obtain due to the 
scarcity of sources and inherent secrecy involved (Braddon, 1999).  Additionally, no 
single source provides defense R&D data for all countries.  Defense R&D data are 
available from the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) Annual Conversion 
Surveys, OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators; Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbooks, European Defense Agency (EDA), and from 
national defense statistics of defense ministries of countries (Hartley, 2006, 2011).  
Worldwide comparisons can be made by only gathering data from all of these sources.  
 In addition to the scarcity of data-producing sources, there are also issues with the 
reliability of the published data.  Table 2 (derived from Hartley (2006, 2011)) details 
many of these data reliability issues.  The lack of consensus as to the mechanism by 
which defense R&D contributes to total military capability can be partially explained by 
the data reliability issues mentioned below.  All of the problems below limit the 
availability of defense R&D data, and make it difficult to assess the efficiency of a 
nation’s defense R&D spending.  In addition, the problems make it difficult to compare 
nations and to follow the trends and variations. 
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Table 2   
Problems in Defense R&D Data 
NUMBER PROBLEMS 
1. 
Activities such as production engineering and pre-production tooling are 
often included in development contracts and defense contractors might 
come across further difficulties in reporting their R&D activities where 
work is sub-contracted. 
2. The distinction between military and non-military R&D may not be obvious and whether and how such civil R&D should be included in 
measures of defense R&D is an issue. 
3. The data are subject to security/secrecy problems.  Even an open society 
such as the United States has ‘black’ research programs. 
4. 
International comparisons require conversion to a common currency, 
usually the US dollars.  The data also vary depending on whether they are 
in current or constant prices; whether they use market or PPP exchange 
rates.  Further problems arise where time-series data are affected by 
discontinuities and changes in the price and exchange rate base year. 
5. The published data on government-funded defense R&D do not include 
any non-government funds (e.g. privately-funded defense R&D). 
6. Defense R&D is subject to annual fluctuations reflecting peaks and troughs in equipment procurement cycles, and defense R&D can vary substantially 
between years. 
7. There is lack of data or reliable data for countries such as China, Israel, 
Iran, North Korea, etc. 
8. Generally, the data is not in time-series. 
Note: Adapted from Hartley (2006, 2011) 
 The lack of empirical studies on defense-related R&D topics may be explained by 
the data scarcity and reliability issues.  Finally, defense R&D is an input into national 
defense, and there is a lack of published data and measures to assess the final outputs, 
both direct in the form of weapons performance and indirect in the form of spin-offs 
(Hartley, 2006).  Therefore, removing data gaps and developing a reliable way to 
measure final defense output would enable a comparative assessment of the efficiency of 
national defense R&D programs.  Such output is measured using the accounting 
convention wherein defense output is measured by defense inputs; however, it is possible 
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to determine the efficiency of defense R&D through assessing military capabilities and 
cost trends (Hartley, 2010). 
Military Capability Concept 
 The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) defines military capability as ''the ability 
to achieve a specified wartime objective, for example, win a battle or a war or destroy a 
target'' (GAO, 1986).  The DoD further divides military capability into four components: 
1) readiness, 2) sustainability, 3) modernization, and 4) force structure (GAO, 1986).  
Readiness is defined as the ability of the military forces, units, weapon systems, or 
equipment to deliver the output for which they were designed in peacetime and at the 
outset of hostilities (GAO, 1986).  Sustainability is the duration the forces can continue to 
fight.  Sustainability involves the ability to resupply engaged forces during combat 
operations and is sometimes measured in terms of the estimated number of fighting days 
for which supplies are available (GAO, 1986).  Modernization is the technical 
sophistication of forces, units, weapon systems, and equipment.  Finally, force structure 
refers to the numbers, size, and composition of units constituting the military forces.  
Force structure is usually described as numbers of divisions, ships, or wings (GAO, 
1986).  
 Although several attempts have been made to measure total national power 
(Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972; Cline, 1975; Organiski and Kugler, 1978), few 
attempts have been made to measure military power as distinct from economic and 
political power (Friedensburg, 1936; Wright, 1955).  While military power/capability is 
usually the most important component in total national power calculations, typically it is 
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not provided as a separate element.  In fact, there is no consensus on how to measure the 
military capability of a nation (distinct from total national power) at a given time.  
 Early theorists often relied on population and raw material data to extrapolate 
estimated military power.  For example, one of the formulas determined military power 
by multiplying the supply potential of raw materials and population (Friedensburg, 1936).  
Another attempt by Wright (1995) calculates military power by multiplying secondary 
energy production and population (Höhn, 2011).  These early attempts to quantify 
military power were useful when raw materials such as coal directly influenced military 
power.  In the modern era though, the influence of these raw materials on military power 
is diminished.  Later, Marshall (1966) endeavored to calculate the military power of the 
former Soviet Union by relying primarily on force structure data.  Importantly, he points 
out that the estimation of a nation's military power can only be possible relative to 
another country or set of countries.  Marshall (1966) points out that, otherwise, the 
calculation says nothing about the actual capabilities of forces of one country to deal with 
another.  Thus, the measures of total national power used in this thesis research provide 
relative data.  
 The Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) is among the best-known 
and most accepted methods for measuring total national capabilities (Power Index, 2006).  
CINC was developed within the Correlates of War project founded by J. David Singer in 
1963 (Power Index, 2006).  It is comprised of three dimensions: military strength, 
measured by adding military expenditure and military personnel; industrial activity, 
measured by adding iron/steel production and energy consumption; and demographic 
factors, measured by adding total population and urban population (Singer et al., 1972; 
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Singer, 1987).  The most recent revision to the Correlates of War project was published 
in 2007.  In the CINC formula, each component is a dimensionless ratio of the world’s 
total and the formula is: 
𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐶 =
𝑇𝑃𝑅 + 𝑈𝑃𝑅 + 𝐼𝑆𝑃𝑅 + 𝐸𝐶𝑅 + 𝑀𝐸𝑅 + 𝑀𝑃𝑅
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Where:  
             𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑
 
 TPR = Total population of country ratio, 
 UPR = Urban population of country ratio,  
 ISPR = Iron and steel production of country ratio,  
 ECR = Primary energy consumption ratio, 
 MER = Military expenditure ratio, 
 MPR = Military personnel ratio. 
 More recently, Arena (2012) proposed a formula for military power calculation, 
which is derived from CINC.  CINC does not take into account the quality and the 
technological sophistication of armed forces.  Therefore, Arena (2012)'s goal was to 
account for the size of a military and its sophistication.  He subsequently proposed the 
following formula (see Appendix A for 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤). 
𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 = Π𝑖,𝑡 𝑞𝑖,𝑡 
Where: 
             𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 : Arena's military power index, 
             Π𝑖,𝑡 : Discounted measures of the military personnel of country i in year t, 
14 
 
              𝑞𝑖,𝑡 : Discounted measures of the quality ratios (military expenditures per troop)  
          of country i in year t. 
 Discounted measures of the military personnel of country i in year t is specifically:  
Π𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡
Π 
Where 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is t he military personnel for country i in year t, and 𝛿𝑡
Π  is a 5-year 
moving average that is specifically defined as, 
𝛿𝑡
Π =
𝑚𝚤𝑙𝑝𝑒𝑟𝚤,𝑡−1�������������� + 𝑚𝚤𝑙𝑝𝑒𝑟𝚤,𝑡−2�������������� + ⋯+ 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−5
5
 
Where 𝑚𝚤𝑙𝑝𝑒𝑟𝚤,𝑡����������� is the global average military personnel in year t.  Similarly, the 
discounted measures of the quality ratios of country i in year t is, 
𝑞𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡
𝑞 
Where 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡is the quality ratio for country i in year t (taken by dividing the military 
expenditures for that country by its military personnel), and 𝛿𝑡
𝑞 is 5-year moving average 
of the average quality ratio. 
  Another recent attempt to measure military power is produced by the Global 
Firepower (GFP) website (http://www.globalfirepower.com).  This website uses over 40 
publicly available factors to compute a power index score (referred to as 𝐺𝐹𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 in 
this research), which is used to rank order 68 countries by military power (see Appendix 
B for 𝐺𝐹𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 list).  The explanation behind the rankings and the computation of 
𝐺𝐹𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 itself is not provided, which makes the data difficult to interpret; nevertheless, 
many published articles (Zedalis, 2007; Nazar, 2007; Hamdy, 2010; Prasetya, 2012; 
Silhan, 2012) cite the website.  Prior to January 2013, the website was only providing the 
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rankings and the raw data for each included nation; however, in January 2013, the 
website was updated and now it includes the aforementioned 𝐺𝐹𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤.  Included in the 
over 40 variables are military factors (the number of tanks, aircraft, ships etc.), 
demographic factors (total population, available work force, etc.), logistical factors (labor 
force, railway coverage, etc.), financial factors (annual defense budget, external debt, 
etc.), and geographic factors (coastline, land area, etc.). 
 The formulas described above all include measurements of tangible assets (''hard'' 
powers).  However, there are also formulas (Cline, 1975; Beckman, 1984) that measure 
national power by relying on intangible assets (''soft'' powers) such as social development 
level, government integrity, etc.  In the last three decades, the Chinese have developed 
various concepts of Comprehensive National Power (CNP) to measure national power 
including ''soft'' powers (Pillsbury, 2000).  One of the CNP formulas created by Wang 
Songfen from Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) is outlined in Table 3. 
Table 3   
Weighted Coefficients in Comprehensive National Power (CNP) Formula 
NATIONAL POWER FACTOR WEIGHTED COEFFICIENT 
Total CNP 1.00 
Natural Resources 0.08 
Economic Activities Capability 0.28 
Foreign Economic Activities Capability 0.13 
Scientific and Technological Capability 0.15 
Social Development Level 0.10 
Military Capability 0.10 
Government Regulation and Control Capability 0.08 
Foreign Affairs Capability 0.08 
Note: Reproduced from Pillsburry (2000) (Original source Songfen (1996)) 
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 Since 2002, the Indian government has been developing their National Security 
Index (NSI), which is the result of a general paradigm shift from focusing solely on 
''hard'' powers to also including ''soft'' powers (Hwang, 2008).  According to Hwang 
(2010), the NSI sometimes produces unconvincing results, such as ranking Norway as the 
third most powerful country.  Hwang (2010) points out that ranking Norway, with its 
population of five million people, as the third most powerful country in the world is 
implausible.  Certainly, Norway is a very rich country due to its offshore oil and the high 
level of social infrastructure, which skews its per capita measurements.  Hwang (2008) 
proposed another measure of national power, which was derived from CNP and NSI.  In 
addition, Hwang (2008) adds energy production and nuclear weapons to his formula to 
calculate national power, which he called Integrated State Power (ISP).  In his formula 
(see Appendix C), Hwang (2008) proposes that military expenditures and arms 
production should be calculated by multiplying their percentage share of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) with certain socio-economic factors.  The NSI and ISP formulas are 
detailed in Table 4 and Figure 3, respectively.  
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Table 4   
National Security Index-2007 Formula 
WEIGHT NATIONAL POWER FACTOR 
25% Economic Strength 
18.75% GDP at Official Exchange Rate, 2005 
6.25% Average Annual GDP Growth Rate in %, 2000-2005 
25% Defense Capability 
10.00% Armed Forces Personnel  
7.50% Defense Expenditure at Official Exchange Rate 
2.50% Main Battle Tanks 
2.50% Aircraft 
2.50% Principal Surface Combatants 
20% Energy Security 
10.00% Per Capita Energy Production in Metric Tons of Oil Equivalent, 2004 
10.00% Net Energy Imports in Millions $, 2004 
15% Technological Strength 
2.25% High Technology Exports as Percentage of Manufactured Exports, 2004 
2.25% Total Number of Patents, 2000-2004 
6.00% Research and Development Expenditure as % of GDP 
2.25% Researchers per Million 
2.25% Scientific and Technical Journal Articles, 2004 
15% Effective Population 
9.00% Population Aged 15-64, 2004 
3.00% Population Educated up to Post-Secondary Level, 2000 
3.00% Per Capita GDP at Official Exchange Rate, 2005 
Note: Reproduced from Hwang (2010) (Original source Kumar (2008)) 
 
 Integrity Education 
Military 
Expenditures 
Arms 
Production 
6.25% Integrity 
6.25% Education 
Life 
Expectancy 
Economic 
Level 
6.25% Life Expectancy 
6.25% Economic Level 
Energy Production Nuclear Weapons 
12.50% Military Expenditures 
12.50% Arms Production 
25.00% Energy Production 
25.00% Nuclear Weapons 
Figure 3.  Integrated State Power Formula Weights (Note: Reproduced from Hwang, 
2008:13) 
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Spillover Effects of Defense R&D and Interrelations with Civil R&D 
 Generally, the purpose of defense R&D is to expand military capability for the 
armed forces of a country.  Any spin-off of technologies from defense R&D programs is 
usually not a prime motivation but more often an unintended consequence, unless a dual-
use strategy has been developed (Dunne & Braddon, 2008).  Nevertheless, concerns with 
the role of military R&D and its consequences in other secondary areas, such as 
industrial/social effects, have been the focus of research by economists over the years 
(Dunne & Braddon, 2008).  However, measurement difficulties and unclear opportunity 
costs have generated a lack of consensus in this area (Dunne & Braddon, 2008; Hartley, 
2011). 
While some military R&D efforts eventually spill over into commercial 
applications, there is often a temporary advantage for the researching organization and its 
sponsors to keeping the technology secret.  In fact, obtaining an impossible-to-mimic 
advantage is often the primary goal of military R&D spending.  Military organizations 
that have R&D capability clearly benefit from early access to innovative technology, 
patents, data rights, and strategically marketing various levels of the technology to other 
countries (James, 2004).  For instance, the U.S. exports many different versions of the F-
16 fighter around the world but keeps its most capable versions for its own use.  
Defense R&D investments may produce secondary benefits (''spin-offs'') if 
successful; however, when these investments fail, the question of whether there would 
have been better alternative uses of the resources arises (Hartley, 2011).  These 
alternative uses, or ''opportunity costs'' are, of course, speculative.  There are diverse 
examples of technology spin-offs from defense R&D.  They include the transfer of 
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military aircraft and jet engine technology to civil aircraft, the innovation of Light 
Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation (LASER) and the Global Positioning 
System (GPS), and the development of the Internet.  However, the question of the market 
value of such spin-offs, and whether there are better alternative uses of defense R&D 
resources, still exists (Hartley, 2011). 
Nations must decide whether to invest revenue in R&D spending or on alternative 
uses.  Once they decide how much to invest in R&D spending, they must also determine 
what proportion of the R&D should be defense versus civilian in nature.  Brzoska (2005) 
provides five ''ideal type'' approaches (often combined in practice), which are 
summarized in Figure 4 and discussed in the remainder of the chapter. 
''Spin-off'' approach: During the early Cold War days, military R&D was the 
fundamental activity in science and technology (S&T) in many countries.  Military R&D 
dominated S&T because of the relative size of funding and advanced military knowledge 
and technology applications.  The military knowledge gained was applied particularly in 
aerospace, space, and material sciences, but the overall record of producing civilian spin-
off has been mixed using this approach (Brzoska, 2005).  
''Warfare and welfare'' approach: Beginning in the 1960s, some governments 
began to support military and civilian R&D simultaneously while the sectors continued to 
be institutionally split.  In this approach, military R&D received priority, but it was 
implemented in a manner designed to simultaneously develop strategic civilian 
industries.  For instance, in France, the high cost of developing an independent nuclear 
weapons force was matched with the development of a large nuclear power sector 
(Brzoska, 2005).  
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Figure 4.  Elements of Civilian/Military R&D Interaction (Note: Reproduced from 
Brzoska, 2005:21) 
''Dual-use'' approach: The purpose of dual-use approach is to improve generic 
knowledge and technology contributions from both military and civilian R&D.  As a 
result, a technology ''pool'' is constructed (Brzoska, 2005).  The difference between the 
dual-use and warfare and welfare approaches is that dual-use aims to collect the 
knowledge and technology under one roof while warfare and welfare aims for each 
sector to obtain its own results.  
''Civil-military integration'' approach: Unlike the first three approaches, the civil-
military integration approach emphasizes the importance of civilian R&D to military 
R&D.  In Germany, for instance, since the mid-1950s, most military R&D occurs in large 
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private companies such as Siemens and Daimler-Benz (Brzoska, 2005).  Technological 
capabilities, knowledge, research assets, and researchers are used by both civilian and 
military purposes as far as secrecy requirements allow.  Thus, there is a constant 
conversion and reversion of the factors of production (Brzoska, 2005).  The U.S. has 
been operating using this strategy since the late 1990s (James, 2004).  Much of new 
technology expertise comes from civilian R&D and industry while military R&D focuses 
on closing technology gaps on the one hand and on the integration of civilian and military 
technology for military purposes on the other (Brzoska, 2005). 
''Spin-in'' approach: This approach is the opposite of the spin-off approach.  In 
the spin-in approach, civilian R&D and industry replace the dominance of military R&D.  
Japan after the 1950s is an example of the spin-in approach.  In Japan, military R&D is 
subordinate to civilian R&D and the role of military R&D is to cover areas where no 
civilian knowledge or technology is available.  Most of the military technology either 
comes from the civilian sector or is imported, and domestic weapons are built combining 
imported knowledge and expertise gained in civilian production (Brzoska, 2005). 
Summary 
 In chapter II, first, the concept of defense R&D, and the problems of defense 
R&D were introduced.  Then, the definition of military capability was provided, and the 
calculation of military capability was discussed.  Finally, the chapter concluded by 
describing the interactions of military R&D and civil R&D.  
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III. Methodology 
 This chapter opens with a detailed description of the methodology used during the 
research.  It outlines datasets reviewed, data estimation approaches, and data analysis 
techniques necessary to address the research questions.  First, the datasets chosen for 
analysis and consolidation are introduced.  Following the description of the dataset, the 
methodology used to develop the military capability and defense R&D measures is 
explained.  Next, the chapter covers how some of the absent defense R&D data points are 
estimated.  Finally, the chapter ends with the data analysis approach. 
Datasets 
 In this study, it was necessary to develop three different consolidated datasets: 
one to calculate military capability, one to estimate defense R&D, and one to construct 
the technological spillover index.  Four source datasets were aggregated by country and 
year providing the basis for the analysis of military capability.  These datasets were the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database, 
the United Nations Human Development Report, the Transparency International's 
corruption perception index, and the World Bank Database (see Table 5).  Together, these 
data facilitated a military capabilities analysis of 194 countries.  However, 57 countries 
were excluded due to incomplete data.  The researcher excluded a country's data points 
when five or more variables out of ten were not available.  Ultimately, the final military 
power analysis dataset includes 137 countries.  
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Table 5   
Datasets Used for Military Capability Calculations 
SOURCE COLLECTED VARIABLE DATA YEAR 
U.N. Human 
Development Report 
Life expectancy, gross enrollment 
ratio, adult literacy 
2011 
Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI) 
Military expenditure 2012 
Transparency 
International 
(www.transparency.org) 
Corruption perception index 
(Integrity) 
2012 
World Bank Database GDP, military personnel numbers 2011 
 
 Six datasets were aggregated by country and year providing the basis for the 
defense R&D data analysis.  These datasets were the European Defense Agency (EDA) 
Report, the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) Asian Defense Spending 
Report, SIPRI Yearbook, the World Bank Database, the website of Turkish Statistical 
Institute, and Hartley (2011) (see Table 6).  Together, these data facilitated a defense 
R&D analysis of 33 countries from all over the world.  Although many different datasets 
were used, only 33 countries provided complete defense R&D data.  A defense R&D data 
point was calculated for South Africa from raw input values (34 countries).  Additionally, 
the researcher estimated defense R&D data for 48 countries.  The methodology used to 
estimate this data is explained in section 3.3.  
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Table 6   
Datasets Used for Defense R&D Calculations 
SOURCE COLLECTED VARIABLE DATA YEAR 
ACCESSED 
ON 
European Defense Agency 
(EDA) Defense Data Report 
Defense R&D expenditure of 
European countries 
2010 Dec 15, 2012 
Center For Strategic & 
International Studies (CSIS) 
Asian Defense Spending 
2000-2011 Report 
Defense R&D expenditure of 
Asian countries 
October 
2012 
Jan 18, 2013 
World Bank Database GERD as percentage of GDP 2011 Jan 20, 2013 
Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI) 
Military expenditures as 
percentage of GDP 
2012 Jan 5, 2013 
Turkish Statistical Institute 
(www.turkstat.gov.tr)  
Defense R&D expenditure of 
Turkey  
2012 Dec 10, 2012 
Hartley (2011) Defense R&D expenditure of 
different countries 
2011 July 10, 2012 
 
 Two datasets were aggregated by country and year providing the basis for the 
analysis of the technological spillover index.  These datasets were SCImago (2007) and 
World Bank Database (see Table 7).  Together, these data facilitated the construction of a 
technological spillover index for 137 countries. 
Table 7   
Datasets Used for Technological Spillover Index Construction 
SOURCE COLLECTED VARIABLE DATA YEAR 
ACCESSED 
ON 
SCImago  
(www. scimagojr.com) 
Scientific Publications 1996-
2007 
Feb 13, 2013 
 
World Bank Database 
Patent Applications, 
Researchers in R&D per million 
people 
2010  
2009 
Feb 13, 2013 
  
 Data for expenditure variables were adjusted to U.S. dollars to ensure 
commensurability in the final aggregated dataset.  The available data are provided in 
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three types of currencies: Dollars, Euros, and Turkish liras.  Data that were originally 
measured in Euros were adjusted using euro-dollar exchange rates specified by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (http://www.imf.org).  Data that were originally 
measured in Turkish liras were adjusted using the Turkish lira-dollar exchange rates of 
The Central Bank of Turkey (http://www.tcmb.gov. tr).  Since the majority of the datasets 
included data during a period of relatively low inflation (2009 to 2012), inflation effects 
were ignored for the purpose of the study.  
Military Capability Formulas  
 The existing military power indexes (𝐺𝐹𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤), military power formulas 
(𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤), and the military power portions of total national power calculations 
(derived from CINC and Hwang's formula) were used during the research.  The military 
power-related variables are separated from the total national power measures because the 
goal was to measure the effect of defense R&D on military capability, not on total 
national power. 
 Since one of the components of the CINC formula is military strength, it is 
assumed that the military power portion of the formula can be used as a military power 
index score.  It is logical to separate military power from total national power because the 
CINC index is the average of the demographic, economic, and military components and 
each of these components have equal weight in the formula.  From the CINC index 
formula, the following formula was created to measure military power and the military 
power index was modified to:  
𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤=(MER+MPR)/2 
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Where 𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 is the military power index derived from CINC total national power 
formula, MER is the military expenditure ratio, and MPR is the military personnel ratio. 
 The second formula, Hwang (2008)'s Integrated State Power formula, was also 
modified to meet the military power calculation requirement.  Hwang (2008)'s formula 
takes into account 50% military power (by multiplying military expenditures and arms 
production with certain socio-economic factors) and 50% nuclear power and energy 
production.  In Hwang (2008)'s military power calculations, nuclear weapons were 
excluded because the nuclear capability of many countries is unconfirmed or disputed.  
Energy production was also excluded from Hwang (2008)'s formula.  Additionally, the 
variable ''arms production as percentage of GDP'' was changed to ''employment in arms 
production'' because of data availability.  Finally, the new formula to calculate military 
power index was: 
𝐻𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤= (ME% + AP%) x ($GDP + LE +INT + EDU) 
Where: 
             𝐻𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 : The military power index derived from Hwang's Integrated State  
      Power formula  
 $GDP : Nominal GDP, 
 LE : Life Expectancy,  
 INT : Integrity,  
 EDU : Education,  
 ME % : Military Expenditures as Percentage of GDP,  
 AP % : Arms Production as Percentage of GDP.  
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 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 was derived from the CINC total national power formula; since the 
formula was presented as the military power calculation, it will be used without any 
changes.  Another military power index, mentioned before, is 𝐺𝐹𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 and the scores 
are ready-to-use so there were no adjustments.  However, 𝐺𝐹𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 scores are indexed 
on a perfect value of zero such that countries with a smaller index have higher rankings.  
To prevent confusion during analysis of the data, 𝐺𝐹𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 was inverted so that higher 
𝐺𝐹𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 index scores would indicate the higher ranking. 
Defense R&D Expenditure Estimation 
 Recall that research question number one was, ''How can defense R&D 
expenditure data be estimated when countries choose not to reveal it?"  The researcher 
tried to answer this research question in this section.  During the Cold War era, the U.S. 
intelligence community performed studies to estimate the Soviet Union's military R&D 
expenditures.  The military R&D expenditure estimates from those studies had a direct 
and consistent relationship with the Soviet Union's national science expenditures (GAO, 
1972).  In a similar vein, this research relies on science expenditures (Gross expenditure 
on research and development (GERD)) to estimate military R&D expenditures when 
those numbers were not available.  Specifically, military expenditures as a percentage of 
GDP and GERD as a percentage of GDP are used to aid in estimation of defense R&D 
expenditures for 48 countries.  
 Multiple correlations were conducted to gain insight into the relationships among 
expenditure variables.  Military expenditure was highly positively related to defense 
R&D expenditure for countries whose defense R&D expenditure was known.  The 
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correlation coefficient was 0.99, which implies that the more a country spends on 
defense, the more it spends on defense R&D.  Additionally, the relationship between 
overall R&D (GERD) and military expenditure was positive, with a correlation 
coefficient of 0.90.  Finally, GERD is positively related to defense R&D with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.87.  
 Defense R&D data for 48 countries was estimated by multiplying the two 
variables: military expenditures as percentage of GDP and GERD as percentage of GDP.  
The result was then multiplied by GERD raw data.  In this way, the defense R&D dataset 
is increased to 82 countries, with 34 provided data points, and 48 estimated data points.  
As a test of the estimation method, a correlation between the 34 known data points and 
the corresponding estimate for the same data point were performed.  The estimated 
defense R&D data points and known defense R&D data points were positively correlated 
and the correlation coefficient for this relationship was 0.989.  Therefore, the estimated 
defense R&D data and known defense R&D data move in the same direction and 
estimated data points appear reasonable for the purpose of this study.  
 Additional tests were performed to reveal if the estimation method was 
reasonable.  Brzoska (2005) states that the United States (number one in defense R&D 
expenditure) spends approximately more than 60% of the world's total defense R&D 
expenditure.  The estimation method predicts 69%.  Sköns, Loose-Weintraub, 
Omitoogun, Stalenheim, & Weidacher (2001) reveals that total expenditure on military 
R&D for the five largest countries (USA, UK, France, China, and Germany) was 84%.  
The estimation method predicts 89%.  Finally, Hartley (2011) reveals that the top six 
countries (France, Germany, UK, Spain, Sweden, and Italy) in Europe expend 99% of 
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Europe's defense R&D.  The estimation method predicts 92%.  Therefore, the results of 
the three tests support the assertion that the estimation method used in this study is 
reasonable and acceptable. 
Technological Spillover Index Production 
 For the purpose of this study, spillover effects include such items as increased 
technological know-how, more engineering students and degrees, and commercial 
applications and patents.  Since no existing measures for spillover were found, a 
technological spillover index was constructed.  The technological spillover index was 
comprised of three variables obtained from the SCImago (2007) and World Data Bank 
datasets: 1) the total of resident and non-resident patent applications, 2) scientific 
publications for ten years, and 3) the number of researchers in R&D per million people.  
The index is calculated as the average of the three variables' data points (dimensionless 
ratios of each country to the world).  In some cases, only two of the variables were 
available, in which case the index was the average of the two available data points. 
 The variables of the technological spillover index were chosen based on existing 
literature.  According to Science and Engineering Indicators (2012), the outputs of 
academic research are scientific publications and patent applications.  In addition, the 
technological strength factor in the National Security Index-2007 formula (shown in 
Table 4) includes similar variables to measure technological strength.  The index includes 
business and higher education variables because the literature describes defense R&D 
spillover effects from both of these areas (Braddon, 1999; Peled, 2001; Dunne & 
Braddon, 2008).  Additionally, the number of researchers per million people helps us to 
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understand the work force in research and development so this variable is added to the 
index formula.  Finally, the formula is: 
𝑇𝑆𝐼 = 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 (𝑃𝐴𝑅 + 𝑆𝑃𝑅 + 𝑁𝑅𝑅) 
Where:  
             𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑
 
 TSI: Technological Spillover Index, 
 PAR: Patent Applications Ratio, 
 SPR: Scientific Publications Ratio, 
  NRR: Number of Researchers in R&D per million people Ratio. 
Data Analysis Approach 
 As described above, three aggregated datasets were used for data analysis: the 
military capability aggregated dataset, the defense R&D aggregated dataset, and the 
technological spillover index aggregated dataset.  Ultimately, these three datasets were 
combined into a format compatible with the SPSS software program to analyze the data.  
Statistical measures such as correlations were used to understand the effect of defense 
R&D on military capability and ''spillover.''  Presumably, countries expect that their 
defense R&D expenditures will result in increased military capability in the future.  
Therefore, it is logical to view the relationship of defense R&D expenditures with 
military capability and spillover as chronological and causal.  Nevertheless, this thesis 
research relies primarily on correlational relationships to test concepts and, therefore, no 
results from this study imply causation or direction.  It is possible that the relationship is 
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recursive or occurs in the opposite direction (military capability leads to defense R&D 
expenditure). 
 Summary 
Chapter III introduced the data collection and aggregation methodology; it also 
described variable creation and testing.  The chapter also explained data estimation 
procedures and presented data analysis formulas that were used to obtain the results.  The 
next chapter will present the results and the analysis of the study.  
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IV. Results and Analysis 
 In this section, the results and analysis of the study are presented.  First, the 
relationship between the total national power formulas and derived military power 
formulas are introduced.  Then, the correlations of defense R&D with the four military 
capabilities formulas and with the technologic spillover index are presented.  The chapter 
ends with the analysis of results. 
Comparing National Power Formulas and the Derived Military Capability 
Formulas  
 In this study, two military power formulas were derived from two total national 
power formulas.  The raw results from the two total national power formulas were 
normalized for easy comparison, and the first 15 countries and Turkey are shown in  
Table 8 (see Appendix D for full list).  The correlation between two national power 
formulas was 0.842 (significant at the.01 level).  It can be interpreted that although each 
formula takes into account different factors as input, the formulas reveal similar outputs.  
 In this study, the derived military power indexes are referred to as 𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 
and 𝐻𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤.  The normalized results of 𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 and 𝐻𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 of the first 
15 countries and of Turkey are shown in Table 9 (see Appendix E for full list).  These 
military power indexes are highly correlated with the original total national power 
indexes (significant at the .01 level).  Specifically, the correlation between CINC and 
𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 was 0.798, and the correlation coefficient between Hwang and 
𝐻𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 was 0.969 (both significant at the .01 level).  
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Table 8   
Normalized Raw Results of CINC and Hwang 
* Countries, which appear on Table 8 but do not appear on Table 9. 
  
RANK COUNTRY CINC RESULTS COUNTRY 
HWANG 
RESULTS 
1 China 1.397 USA 1.000 
2 USA 1.000 China 0.467 
3 India 0.517 Russian Federation 0.238 
4 Japan 0.300 United Kingdom 0.170 
5 Russian Federation 0.276 France 0.146 
6 Brazil 0.173 India 0.104 
7 Germany 0.169 Japan 0.077 
8 South Korea 0.168 Canada* 0.070 
9 United Kingdom 0.149 Germany 0.057 
10 France 0.133 Australia 0.044 
11 Italy 0.123 Saudi Arabia 0.035 
12 Turkey* 0.101 Brazil* 0.031 
13 Pakistan 0.097 South Korea 0.025 
14 Indonesia* 0.096 Indonesia* 0.024 
15 Iran 0.095 Mexico* 0.024 
27 Australia 0.036 Turkey 0.011 
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Table 9   
Normalized Results of CINCmilpow and Hwangmilpow 
** Countries, which appear on Table 9 but do not appear on Table 8. 
 Because the normalized values are heavily weighted towards the top few 
countries, it was determined that rank data (ordinal) might be more meaningful.  In fact, 
rank data helps to smooth data distortions due to outliers (Agresti, 2010; Cateni, Colla, & 
Vannucci, 2008).  Therefore, the rankings obtained from both the derived and original 
formulas were also compared.  CINC and 𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 rankings have a correlation of 
0.953, and Hwang and 𝐻𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 rankings have a correlation of 0.969 (both 
significant at the .01 level).  Clearly, military power plays an important role in these total 
national power calculations.  
 When the rankings from the Hwang total national power and 𝐻𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 
indexes are analyzed, the rankings of some countries are dramatically changed (see Table 
RANK COUNTRY 𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 RESULTS COUNTRY 
𝑯𝒘𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
RESULTS 
1 USA 1.000 USA 1.000 
2 China 0.321 China 0.494 
3 Russian Federation  0.152 Russian Federation 0.070 
4 India  0.146 France  0.038 
5 France 0.100 Japan 0.026 
6 United Kingdom  0.089 India 0.023 
7 Japan  0.087 Saudi Arabia 0.022 
8 North Korea** 0.080 Germany 0.021 
9 South Korea 0.080 Israel** 0.017 
10 Saudi Arabia** 0.076 United Kingdom 0.016 
11 Germany 0.070 United Arab Emirates** 0.014 
12 Brazil 0.063 South Korea 0.014 
13 Italy 0.061 Italy** 0.011 
14 Pakistan 0.048 Oman** 0.010 
15 Iran 0.048 Australia 0.010 
16 Turkey 0.044 Brazil 0.010 
19 Australia 0.034 Turkey 0.009 
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8, Table 9, and Table 10).  The three countries with the most dramatic decline in the 
ranking were Mexico, Venezuela, and North Korea.  Mexico has the seventh largest oil 
production share in the world at 3.44%, while Venezuela has the twelfth largest oil 
production share in the world at 2.74% (CIA, 2010).  It is likely that Mexico and 
Venezuela's rankings declined because the derived formula does not include the energy-
related factor.  Likely, North Korea's decline is because the derived formula does not 
include nuclear weapons capability.  On the other hand, Namibia and Lebanon's rankings 
significantly increased.  This is likely due to the two countries' unusually high spending 
on military expenditures as a percentage of GDP. 
Table 10 
Ranking Changes of Some Countries 
 
Comparing Military Power Formulas  
 Recall that research question number two was, ''What are the currently available 
measures of military capability?  Could other measures be developed?  Are military 
capability measures consistent?''  This research question was addressed by analyzing the 
relationship between four different military capability indexes.  This paper has presented 
two existing measures of military power (𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 and 𝐺𝐹𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤) and two derived 
NUMBER COUNTRY HWANG RANK 𝑯𝒘𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 RANK CHANGE 
1 North Korea 17 126 -109 
2 Venezuela  31 109 -78 
3 Mexico 15 92 -77 
4 Nigeria 38 115 -77 
5 Namibia  121 44 +77 
6 Lebanon 106 31 +75 
7 Argentina  30 97 -67 
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measures of military power (𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 and 𝐻𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤).  To determine whether 
these measures were consistent, statistical correlations were obtained.  When the derived 
military power formulas' raw results are analyzed, each formula's raw results are found to 
be highly correlated (significant at the .01 level) except the correlation between 
𝐻𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 and 𝐺𝐹𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤.  The correlation coefficients are given in Table 11 and it 
can be seen that 𝐻𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 and 𝐺𝐹𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 are not significantly related. 
Table 11 
Comparing Military Power Formulas 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 However, when the rankings of the countries by their military capabilities are 
analyzed, all four measurements are highly correlated with each other (significant at the 
.01 level) (see Table 12).  This demonstrates that these four measures are consistent.  
Without evidence of the superiority of one military capability, measure over the others, 
all four indexes were used in the analysis of research question number three.  
Table 12 
Comparing the Rankings of Military Power Formulas 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 𝑯𝒘𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 𝑨𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 𝑮𝑭𝑷𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 1 .962** .705**  .245** 
𝑯𝒘𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 .962** 1 .582** .145 
𝑨𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 .705** .582** 1  .582** 
𝑮𝑭𝑷𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 .245** .145 .582** 1 
 𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
RANK 
𝑯𝒘𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
RANK 
𝑨𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
RANK 
𝑮𝑭𝑷𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘
 RANK 
𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 RANK 1 .689** .908**  .803** 
𝑯𝒘𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 RANK .689** 1 .767** .403** 
𝑨𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 RANK .908** .767** 1  .671** 
𝑮𝑭𝑷𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 RANK .803** .403** .671** 1 
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Relationship between Defense R&D and Military Capability 
 Recall that research question number three was, ''What is the effect of defense 
R&D expenditures on military capability?''  This research question was addressed by 
analyzing the relationship between defense R&D expenditure and military capability by 
four different military capability indexes.  The defense R&D analysis includes 82 
countries, which consists of both known and estimated defense R&D data.  The defense 
R&D expenditure data for the first 15 countries and for Turkey are given in Table 13 (see 
Appendix F for full list) and the correlation coefficients are given in Table 14. 
Table 13 
Defense R&D Data for First 15 Countries and Turkey 
COUNTRY RANK 
DEFENSE R&D 
EXPENDITURE 
($) 
SHARE OF 
THE WORLD 
TOTAL 
ESTIMATED-0 
KNOWN-1 
United States 1 83,193,000,000.00 0.692 1 
China 2 15,000,000,000.00 0.125 1 
France 3 4,157,193,447.60 0.035 1 
Russian Federation 4 3,600,000,000.00 0.030 1 
United Kingdom 5 3,361,961,822.80 0.028 1 
Israel 6 2,471,140,857.98 0.021 0 
Germany 7 1,689,225,624.66 0.014 1 
South Korea 8 1,600,000,000.00 0.013 1 
India 9 1,300,000,000.00 0.010 1 
Japan 10 1,000,000,000.00 0.008 1 
Singapore 11 605,072,278.28 0.005 0 
Brazil 12 438,200,150.12 0.004 0 
Australia 13 242,700,000.00 0.002 1 
Canada 14 201,600,000.00 0.002 1 
Spain 15 188,188,483.27 0.002 1 
Turkey 16 146,275,609.27 0.001 1 
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Table 14 
The Relationship between Defense R&D and Military Capability 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 The results imply that defense R&D expenditure of countries is positively related 
to military capability according to the four different military capability measures.  
However, the degree of relationship varies between measures.  The strength of the 
relationship between defense R&D expenditure and the two derived measures 
(𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 and 𝐻𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤) is stronger than the relationship between defense R&D 
expenditure and the two existing measures (𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 and 𝐺𝐹𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤).  In other 
words, the two derived military capability indexes indicate a stronger relationship 
between defense R&D expenditure and military capability than the other two military 
capability indexes.  Nevertheless, all four measures support the assertion that 
expenditures on defense R&D expenditure have a positive effect on military capability 
(recall that this relationship could be recursive or could occur in the opposite direction). 
 After conducting an outlier analysis, two outlier data points (the United States and 
China) were found in the defense R&D expenditure dataset.  The distribution of the 
defense R&D expenditure data is shown in Figure 5. 
 𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 𝑯𝒘𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 𝑨𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 𝑮𝑭𝑷𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
Defense R&D .970** .959** .581**  .323* 
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Figure 5.  The Distribution of Defense R&D Expenditure Data 
 Therefore, the two-outlier data points were excluded to obtain more accurate 
results.  After excluding the two outlier countries, the correlation results of the four 
military capability measures become closer to each other, specifically, the correlation 
coefficient for 𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 and 𝐻𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 decreased and the correlation coefficient 
for 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 and 𝐺𝐹𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 increased (see Table 15).  
Table 15 
The Relationship between Defense R&D and Military Capability after Excluding Outliers 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 Additionally, the relationship between the rankings of countries' defense R&D 
expenditure and four military capability measures was analyzed.  The correlation 
coefficients are very close to each other and the rankings of countries' defense R&D 
expenditure and the rankings of countries' military capability are positively related 
(significant at the .01 level) (see Table 16). 
 
 𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 𝑯𝒘𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 𝑨𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 𝑮𝑭𝑷𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
Defense R&D .746** .817** .686** .529** 
The United 
States 
China 
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Table 16 
The Relationship between Defense R&D Ranking and Military Capability Ranking 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Spillover Effects of Defense R&D Results 
 Recall that research question number four was, ''What are the effects of defense 
R&D expenditures beyond military capability?''  This research question was answered by 
analyzing the relationship between defense R&D expenditure and technological spillover 
index.  The results of the technological spillover index for the first 15 countries and 
Turkey are given in Table 17.  The full list of technological spillover index is provided in 
Appendix G.  
 Defense R&D expenditure is positively related to technological spillover index 
with a correlation coefficient of 0.818 (significant at the .01 level).  Countries that spend 
more on defense R&D are likely to produce greater numbers of researchers, patents, and 
scientific publications.  When the United States and China are removed from this 
analysis, the correlation coefficient drops to 0.494 (significant at the .01 level), still a 
very strong relationship.  Finally, the rankings of countries' defense R&D expenditure and 
technological spillover indexes are also positively correlated and the correlation 
coefficient for this relationship is 0.788 (significant at the .01 level).  Note that the United 
States and China were not removed for the ranked analysis, since rank data is less 
influenced by outliers. 
 
 𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
RANK 
𝑯𝒘𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
RANK 
𝑨𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
RANK 
𝑮𝑭𝑷𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
RANK 
Defense R&D 
RANK .796** .755** .827** .662** 
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Table 17 
Technological Spillover Indexes for First 15 Countries and Turkey 
COUNTRY TECHNOLOGICAL SPILLOVER INDEX RANK 
United States 0.18384388 1 
China 0.10538958 2 
Japan 0.09758488 3 
South Korea 0.04988763 4 
Germany 0.04094510 5 
United Kingdom 0.03577937 6 
Canada 0.02857774 7 
France 0.02695104 8 
Russian Federation 0.02219928 9 
Australia 0.02254537 10 
Finland 0.02064598 11 
Denmark 0.01784690 12 
Singapore 0.01726406 13 
Italy 0.01711301 14 
Sweden 0.01679087 15 
Turkey 0.00596503 35 
 
Analysis of Results 
 The main purpose of this study was to understand the effect of defense R&D 
expenditures on military capability and technological spillover.  The study succeeds in 
providing insight into this research area.  The results of the study provide several 
important findings and contribute new measurement tools for researchers. 
 One of the important findings from this research is that there are available 
measures of military capability and that these measures are highly consistent with each 
other when the raw results or rankings of the countries are analyzed.  These findings 
imply that any of the military capability indexes can be used in further research to 
measure military capability.  However, 𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 and 𝐻𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 are less complex 
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measures requiring fewer inputs.  These measures appear to be consistent with 
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 and 𝐺𝐹𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤, providing evidence of construct validity.  Because they are 
simpler, require fewer inputs, and appear to have validity, researchers may prefer them. 
 Another important finding of this research is that defense R&D expenditure is 
highly correlated with military capability.  Not surprisingly, the findings demonstrated 
that countries with higher defense R&D expenditures tend to have a stronger military 
capability (or alternatively, countries with stronger military capability tend to expend 
more on defense R&D).  One possible interpretation of this finding is that medium sized 
countries that wish to increase their military capability should invest more in defense 
R&D (see section 5.1). 
 Finally, another finding of the study revealed that defense R&D expenditure is 
highly correlated with technological spillover effects.  This finding demonstrated that 
countries that spend more on defense R&D are likely to produce greater numbers of 
researchers, patents, and scientific publications (or vice versa).  One possible 
interpretation of this finding is that medium sized countries wishing to increase the 
numbers of researchers, patents, and scientific publications should invest more in defense 
R&D (see section 5.1). 
 In addition to the aforementioned findings, the study also contributed to the 
academic literature in three ways by providing: new measures of military capability, a 
new estimation method for defense R&D expenditures, and a new method to measure 
technological spillover effect from defense R&D expenditures.  The contributions of this 
study include the following: 
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 1) The study developed simpler measures of military capability than were 
previously available to researchers.  Because 𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 and 𝐻𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 rely on 
simpler inputs than 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 and 𝐺𝐹𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤 and appear to have reasonable validity, 
researchers may choose to adopt them in future projects. 
 2) The study developed a new method to estimate defense R&D expenditure when 
countries choose not to reveal it.  As mentioned before, some countries choose not to 
reveal their defense R&D expenditures; however, these data points are important to 
compare the strength of the countries' military capabilities.  The new method is going to 
help future researchers fill the data gaps in this study area. 
 3) The study developed a new method for measuring the technological spillover 
effects from defense R&D expenditures.  Based on an extensive search of the literature, 
no measure for technological spillover from defense R&D expenditures existed prior to 
this study.  This contribution is going to help future researchers fill this gap in the 
literature. 
Summary 
 Chapter IV presented the results and analysis of this study.  The chapter started 
with the results of military power formulas and their relationship with each other.  The 
chapter continued with the relationships of defense R&D expenditure with the military 
capability formulas and with the technological spillover index.  Then, the obtained results 
were presented and finally, the analysis of the results was presented.  
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 The purpose of this thesis research was to understand the effect of defense R&D 
expenditures on military capability and technological spillover.  This chapter provides the 
research conclusions, limitations, and recommendations for further research.  The first 
section provides the research conclusions.  The next section summarizes the limitations 
of this study based on data availability, result interpretation, and research findings.  The 
last section in the chapter provides some suggestions for future research designed to 
enhance knowledge in this area of research. 
Research Conclusions 
 As mentioned above, generally, the largest nations are able to expend large sums 
on defense R&D investments and weapons procurement, whereas the smallest nations, by 
necessity, focus only on weapons procurement.  However, mid-sized nations face a 
funding dilemma: to invest in defense R&D or to outsource it.  The results of the study 
revealed that defense R&D expenditures are highly positively correlated with military 
capability indexes and with the technological spillover index.  Despite the possibility of 
alternative explanations such as a recursive relationship, it is reasonable to conclude that 
investing in defense R&D leads to military capability and positive technological 
spillover.  Presumably, the primary effects of defense R&D funding occur after 
expenditure. 
 Therefore, mid-size countries, such as Turkey, should seriously consider spending 
a greater proportion of their total defense budget on defense R&D.  This may lead to 
increases in military capability and widespread technological spillover effects.  As 
45 
 
mentioned previously, when mid-sized countries such as Turkey choose to rely on 
outsourcing their defense R&D to more powerful nations, they are vulnerable to the loss 
of support from those more powerful nations.  This study provides further incentive for 
mid-sized countries to invest in their own defense R&D. 
Limitations of the Research 
 Although efforts were taken throughout this research to mitigate risks to 
reliability, there were still limitations and assumptions throughout the research.  The 
limitations and assumptions are listed below: 
 1) The defense-related data of USA was a huge outlier.  Although the United 
States has been the number one country in defense expenditures for decades, the 
expenditures were higher than the historical average during the period of the study 
because of the effect of Iraq and Afghanistan operations. 
 2) The decision to exclude nuclear weapons capability as one of the variables that 
contributes to military power is debatable.  Certainly, if nuclear weapons capability were 
to be included in the analysis, it would influence the conclusions significantly. 
 3) Clearly, ''soft'' powers (such as leadership, training, motivation) play an 
important role in military capability.  As it was not possible to quantify these data, ''soft'' 
powers were assumed equal or ignored. 
 4) It was assumed that there is a transitive relationship between the capabilities of 
countries.  In other words, it is assumed that if country A is more powerful than B, and B 
more powerful than C, that means A is more powerful than C.  This ignores the 
possibility that country C may be more motivated to fight a war against country A than 
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country B.  It also ignores the possibility of geographic advantages that could mitigate 
military power advantages.  For example, if country C is land-locked, the fact that the 
country A has a powerful Navy may be unimportant, whereas if country B has a large 
coastline, that fact may be very important. 
 5) Doubtless, some countries give more importance to defending their territory 
while other countries give more importance to offensive capabilities.  However, the data 
used in the study does not account for this distinction.  Indeed, it was assumed that two 
countries would fight on a neutral battlefield. 
 6) Only 34 countries provided defense R&D data.  To obtain a larger dataset, 48 
defense R&D data points were estimated.  The conclusions of the study depend largely 
upon the accuracy of the estimated data points. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 The success of future research in this area depends upon the availability of 
reliable data from increased numbers of countries.  If extensive time series data become 
available, future longitudinal research may reveal causal relationships.  In addition, future 
researchers may wish to focus on the effects of non-government defense R&D spending.  
It may be possible for researchers to control for economic fluctuations such as inflation or 
recession. 
 Furthermore, this research provides researchers with new tools for analysis such 
as defense R&D expenditure estimation, military capability measurement, and 
technological spillover measurement.  Future researchers may be able to validate, test, or 
47 
 
improve upon these tools.  Ideally, future research will provide countries with actionable 
recommendations or their allocation of different portions of their defense budget.  
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Appendix A. Arenamilpow Index of Countries 
COUNTRY 𝑨𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
NORMALIZED  
𝑨𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘  RANK 
United States 0.788693 1 1 
France 0.470653 0.596750573 2 
Japan 0.435105 0.551678537 3 
China 0.428213 0.542940029 4 
Germany 0.414851 0.525998075 5 
Saudi Arabia 0.414097 0.525042063 6 
Italy 0.412775 0.523365872 7 
Russian Federation 0.397567 0.504083338 8 
Brazil 0.38011 0.48194925 9 
United Kingdom 0.379753 0.481496603 10 
South Korea 0.346354 0.439149327 11 
Israel 0.27667 0.350795557 12 
Turkey 0.273657 0.346975312 13 
India 0.246368 0.312375031 14 
Colombia 0.217702 0.276028822 15 
Singapore 0.212988 0.270051845 16 
Poland 0.209643 0.265810651 17 
Greece 0.198514 0.251699964 18 
Canada 0.19777 0.250756632 19 
Australia 0.178813 0.226720663 20 
Chile 0.178715 0.226596407 21 
United Arab Emirates 0.159412 0.202121738 22 
Algeria 0.158223 0.200614181 23 
Iran 0.154217 0.195534891 24 
Mexico 0.15068 0.191050257 25 
Portugal 0.150016 0.190208357 26 
South Africa 0.141097 0.178899775 27 
Malaysia 0.139289 0.176607374 28 
Netherlands 0.135409 0.171687843 29 
Angola 0.130708 0.165727349 30 
Argentina 0.129123 0.163717695 31 
Ukraine 0.128705 0.163187704 32 
Venezuela 0.127402 0.161535604 33 
Thailand 0.125872 0.159595686 34 
Oman 0.117568 0.149066874 35 
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COUNTRY 𝑨𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
NORMALIZED  
𝑨𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘  RANK 
Morocco 0.10989 0.139331781 36 
Indonesia 0.102897 0.130465213 37 
North Korea 0.10274 0.130266149 38 
Belgium 0.10258 0.130063282 39 
Philippines 0.099069 0.125611613 40 
Pakistan 0.089375 0.113320392 41 
Romania 0.08903 0.11288296 42 
Ecuador 0.08778 0.111298059 43 
Nigeria 0.084903 0.107650252 44 
Norway 0.082274 0.104316889 45 
Peru 0.080329 0.101850784 46 
Lebanon 0.077784 0.098623926 47 
Switzerland 0.077515 0.098282855 48 
Egypt 0.075955 0.096304899 49 
Austria 0.075488 0.095712781 50 
Kuwait 0.073721 0.093472365 51 
Finland 0.073386 0.093047612 52 
Kazakhstan 0.073339 0.092988019 53 
Sweden 0.07284 0.092355327 54 
Azerbaijan 0.072434 0.091840551 55 
Czech Republic 0.072202 0.091546394 56 
Syrian Arab Republic 0.069191 0.087728685 57 
Viet Nam 0.067155 0.085147199 58 
Jordan 0.067136 0.085123109 59 
Iraq 0.066293 0.084054252 60 
Denmark 0.063375 0.08035446 61 
Spain 0.061034 0.077386258 62 
Sri Lanka 0.060918 0.077239179 63 
Hungary 0.059393 0.075305601 64 
Bangladesh 0.053801 0.068215389 65 
Bulgaria 0.049621 0.062915482 66 
Croatia 0.043059 0.054595388 67 
Serbia 0.04289 0.054381109 68 
Qatar 0.039897 0.050586223 69 
Uruguay 0.039573 0.050175417 70 
Slovakia 0.038994 0.049441291 71 
Belarus 0.035904 0.045523417 72 
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COUNTRY 𝑨𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
NORMALIZED  
𝑨𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘  RANK 
Bahrain 0.035876 0.045487915 73 
Tunisia 0.034305 0.043496012 75 
Kenya 0.034305 0.043496012 74 
New Zealand 0.031755 0.040262815 76 
Ireland 0.031646 0.040124611 77 
Slovenia 0.028921 0.036669528 78 
Georgia 0.028249 0.035817485 79 
Armenia 0.025389 0.032191233 80 
Lithuania 0.025329 0.032115158 81 
Dominican Republic 0.023619 0.029947014 82 
GAS Cyprus 0.023352 0.029608479 83 
Cameroon 0.022392 0.028391275 84 
Namibia 0.022143 0.028075563 85 
Afghanistan 0.021637 0.027433995 86 
Bolivia 0.020371 0.025828808 87 
Uganda 0.018961 0.02404104 88 
Brunei Darussalam 0.018359 0.023277752 89 
Botswana 0.018204 0.023081224 90 
Zambia 0.017532 0.022229182 91 
Tanzania 0.01725 0.021871628 92 
Ethiopia 0.016285 0.020648085 93 
Chad 0.015856 0.020104147 94 
El Salvador 0.015741 0.019958336 95 
Kyrgyzstan 0.014117 0.017899233 96 
Senegal 0.013877 0.017594932 97 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.013476 0.017086496 98 
Estonia 0.013473 0.017082693 99 
Nepal 0.013363 0.016943221 100 
Albania 0.012924 0.016386604 101 
Guatemala 0.012298 0.015592886 102 
Honduras 0.012195 0.01546229 103 
Mali 0.011843 0.015015982 104 
Paraguay 0.011298 0.014324965 105 
Latvia 0.010756 0.013637753 106 
Congo (Dem. Rep.) 0.009701 0.012300096 107 
Congo 0.009487 0.012028762 108 
Ghana 0.009204 0.01166994 109 
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COUNTRY 𝑨𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
NORMALIZED  
𝑨𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘  RANK 
Burkina Faso 0.00885 0.011221096 110 
Macedonia 0.008621 0.010930742 111 
Cambodia 0.008555 0.01084706 112 
Gabon 0.008034 0.010186473 113 
Zimbabwe 0.007092 0.008992092 114 
Cuba 0.00617 0.007823069 115 
Montenegro 0.005834 0.007397048 116 
Rwanda 0.005678 0.007199252 117 
Jamaica 0.005405 0.00685311 118 
Madagascar 0.004525 0.00573734 119 
Togo 0.004448 0.00563971 120 
Mongolia 0.004396 0.005573778 121 
Niger 0.003793 0.004809222 122 
Lesotho 0.003709 0.004702717 123 
Nicaragua 0.003597 0.00456071 124 
Fiji 0.003519 0.004461812 125 
Central African Republic 0.003487 0.004421239 126 
Malta 0.003393 0.004302054 127 
Papua New Guinea 0.002997 0.003799958 128 
Guyana 0.002126 0.002695599 129 
Sierra Leone 0.002068 0.00262206 130 
Timor-Leste 0.001899 0.002407781 131 
Moldova 0.00155 0.001965277 132 
Belize 0.001074 0.001361747 133 
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 0.000952 0.00120706 134 
Liberia 0.000712 0.000902759 135 
Cape Verde 0.000663 0.000840631 136 
Seychelles 0.000635 0.000805129 137 
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Appendix B. GFPmilpow of Countries 
COUNTRY RANK 𝑮𝑭𝑷𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 COUNTRY RANK 𝑮𝑭𝑷𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
United States 1 0.2461 Argentina 35 1.2971 
Russia 2 0.2601 Nigeria 36 1.3412 
China 3 0.3644 Austria 37 1.3722 
India 4 0.4346 Algeria 38 1.4065 
United Kingdom 5 0.5174 Syria 39 1.4643 
France 6 0.6151 Venezuela 40 1.4842 
Germany 7 0.6471 Colombia 41 1.4981 
South Korea 8 0.6528 Norway 42 1.5147 
Italy 9 0.6794 Yemen 43 1.5853 
Brazil 10 0.6866 Denmark 44 1.6107 
Turkey 11 0.7016 Finland 45 1.6131 
Pakistan 12 0.7276 Kenya 46 1.6228 
Israel 13 0.7539 Singapore 47 1.6333 
Egypt 14 0.7543 Afghanistan 48 1.6403 
Indonesia 15 0.7591 Greece 49 1.6493 
Iran 16 0.7773 Romania 50 1.6544 
Japan 17 0.7856 Serbia 51 1.6847 
Taiwan 18 0.8588 Chile 52 1.7081 
Canada 19 0.8638 Belgium 53 1.7249 
Thailand 20 0.8919 Croatia 54 1.7413 
Mexico 21 0.9092 Portugal 55 1.7618 
Ukraine 22 0.9126 Jordan 56 1.7716 
Australia 23 0.9361 Iraq 57 1.8043 
Poland 24 0.9511 
United Arab 
Emirates 58 1.8099 
Sweden 25 1.0981 Libya 59 1.8361 
Saudi Arabia 26 1.1003 Georgia 60 1.8521 
Vietnam 27 1.1216 Mongolia 61 2.0348 
North Korea 28 1.1723 Kuwait 62 2.1208 
Ethiopia 29 1.1725 Paraguay 63 2.1238 
Spain 30 1.1792 Nepal 64 2.1578 
Philippines 31 1.1838 Qatar 65 2.4808 
Switzerland 32 1.2266 Lebanon 66 2.5037 
Malaysia 33 1.2465 Uruguay 67 2.5441 
South Africa 34 1.2582 Panama 68 3.0468 
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Appendix C. Integrated State Power Formula 
 Hwang (2008) constructed the formula below to measure Integrated State Power: 
(.625 $GDP + .625 LE + .625 INT + .625 EDU + .25 EP + (.3125 ME% x $GDP) + 
(.3125 ME% x LE) + (.3125 ME % x INT) + (.3125 ME% x EDU) + (.3125 AP% x 
$GDP) + (.3125 AP% x LE) + (.3125 AP% x INT) + (.3125 AP% x EDU) + .125 NWC 
+ .125 NW#) / (.625 $𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖
2+ .625 𝐿𝐸𝑖2 + .625 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖2 + .625 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖2+ .25 𝐸𝑃𝑖2 + .3125 
(𝑀𝐸% 𝑥 $𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖
2 + .3125 (𝑀𝐸% 𝑥 𝐿𝐸)𝑖
2 + .3125 (𝑀𝐸% 𝑥 𝐼𝑁𝑇)𝑖
2 +.3125 
(𝑀𝐸% 𝑥 𝐸𝐷𝑈)𝑖
2 + .3125 (𝐴𝑃% 𝑥 $𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖
2+ .3125 (𝐴𝑃% 𝑥 𝐿𝐸)𝑖
2+ .3125 
(𝐴𝑃% 𝑥 𝐼𝑁𝑇)𝑖
2+ .3125 (𝐴𝑃% 𝑥 𝐸𝐷𝑈)𝑖
2+ .125  𝑁𝑊𝐶𝑖2 + .125 𝑁𝑊#𝑖2 ) 
Where: 
$GDP : Nominal GDP, 
LE : Life Expectancy,  
INT : Integrity,  
EDU : Education,  
EP : Energy Production,  
ME% : Military Expenditures as percentage of GDP,  
AP% : Arms Production as percentage of GDP,  
NWC : Nuclear Weapons Capability (dummy variable),  
NW# : Number of Nuclear Warheads,  
i : percentile.  
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Appendix D. Complete List of Raw Results of National Power Formulas 
COUNTRY CINC*  
CINC 
RANK HWANG **  
HWANG 
RANK 
China 0.1985779 1 7274136000000 2 
United States 0.1421487 2 15560390000000 1 
India 0.0734437 3 1624570000000 6 
Japan 0.0426745 4 1191698000000 7 
Russian Federation 0.0392739 5 3705139000000 3 
Brazil 0.0245967 6 477393399548 12 
Germany 0.0240815 7 894295443562 9 
South Korea 0.0238778 8 382058307230 13 
United Kingdom 0.0211575 9 2644074000000 4 
France 0.0189237 10 2267324000000 5 
Italy 0.0174203 11 313236028852 19 
Turkey 0.014317 12 167121963006 27 
Pakistan 0.0137718 13 276728333157 20 
Indonesia 0.0137077 14 380207527433 14 
Iran 0.0134501 15 270309795500 21 
North Korea  0.0129246 16 331277804664 17 
Mexico 0.0122686 17 371458319734 15 
Ukraine 0.011835 18 140681110337 33 
Spain 0.0113889 19 259818200597 24 
Saudi Arabia 0.0108829 20 544039081355 11 
Canada 0.0106829 21 1090645000000 8 
Egypt 0.0097128 22 181788176473 26 
Bangladesh 0.0080595 23 41121940247 60 
Thailand 0.0079734 24 131491507748 35 
Nigeria 0.0077921 25 114243228683 38 
Viet Nam 0.0076122 26 121266728793 37 
Australia 0.0071125 27 678992572822 10 
Poland 0.0069389 28 264299819568 23 
South Africa 0.0063162 29 160881213237 28 
Colombia 0.0061742 30 125972751719 36 
Philippines 0.0057217 31 45634892986 57 
Netherlands 0.0056463 32 270210944799 22 
Algeria 0.0052899 33 160736324604 29 
Iraq 0.0052218 34 94970885398 44 
Argentina 0.0047209 35 155188833449 30 
Venezuela 0.0045591 36 151543883408 31 
Morocco 0.0044709 37 16710894414 71 
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COUNTRY CINC*  
CINC 
RANK HWANG **  
HWANG 
RANK 
Syrian Arab Republic 0.0044535 38 52945275034 53 
Malaysia 0.0044027 39 148619298424 32 
Congo (Dem. Rep.) 0.0041745 40 6323345045 88 
Belgium 0.0038946 41 88490134947 46 
Ethiopia 0.0038581 42 3023833761 107 
Greece 0.0038126 43 72882986647 50 
Israel 0.0036381 44 340992265172 16 
Kazakhstan 0.0032326 45 88128051843 47 
Singapore 0.0032264 46 106180267527 40 
Romania 0.003213 47 79312841252 48 
Chile 0.0031071 48 64010340699 51 
Peru 0.002986 49 35867007397 63 
United Arab Emirates 0.0029798 50 132227392997 34 
Sweden 0.0029788 51 207454377541 25 
Austria 0.0025715 52 74827489203 49 
Belarus 0.0025568 53 12588455149 76 
Angola 0.0024825 54 43222416863 58 
Czech Republic 0.0023531 55 98877201589 43 
Finland 0.0021444 56 89402233837 45 
Sri Lanka 0.0020778 57 8990448704 82 
Tanzania 0.0019317 58 1585107673 116 
Portugal 0.0018413 59 46188059853 56 
Kenya 0.001777 60 4452361829 94 
Norway 0.0016396 61 329806347252 18 
Hungary 0.0016075 62 42887528419 59 
Cambodia 0.0015558 63 2108954025 112 
Ecuador 0.0015182 64 46819437055 55 
Denmark 0.0014931 65 102527302393 42 
Jordan 0.0014484 66 8187017749 83 
Nepal 0.0014372 67 3322070025 103 
Slovakia 0.0014329 68 33265801905 64 
Bulgaria 0.0014218 69 39105162551 61 
Afghanistan 0.0014201 70 2109572050 111 
Cuba 0.0013522 71 17573885140 69 
Kuwait 0.0013343 72 102693225456 41 
Uganda 0.0013199 73 2121241171 110 
Azerbaijan 0.0012793 74 20416626644 66 
Oman 0.0012173 75 52101950572 54 
Ghana 0.0011087 76 3014848576 108 
56 
 
COUNTRY CINC*  
CINC 
RANK HWANG **  
HWANG 
RANK 
Switzerland 0.001083 77 107678273282 39 
Bolivia 0.0010495 78 14484395218 73 
Zimbabwe 0.0009938 79 4506413306 93 
Serbia 0.0009741 80 31485837563 65 
Dominican Republic 0.0009689 81 3287574828 105 
Cameroon 0.0009505 82 6851042594 87 
Qatar 0.0008841 83 63747140049 52 
Lebanon 0.0008443 84 3180909572 106 
Tunisia 0.0008221 85 17093297415 70 
Guatemala 0.0007892 86 5647759632 89 
New Zealand 0.0007705 87 38392724427 62 
Zambia 0.0007486 88 3552770458 100 
Madagascar 0.000711 89 2058957574 113 
Senegal 0.0006968 90 978342734 122 
Burkina Faso 0.0006447 91 585501563 127 
Ireland 0.0006346 92 18316497517 68 
Armenia 0.0006142 93 4530116181 92 
Rwanda 0.0005813 94 3921944221 97 
Croatia 0.0005799 95 18709293936 67 
El Salvador 0.0005754 96 5437535833 90 
Chad 0.0005676 97 7181065097 86 
Mali 0.0005161 98 645153590 126 
Niger 0.000505 99 496975869 128 
Georgia 0.0005039 100 3338413180 102 
Uruguay 0.0004743 101 8148112726 84 
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 0.0004708 102 1126851885 118 
Honduras 0.0004543 103 1988518664 114 
Paraguay 0.00045 104 15083388342 72 
Lithuania 0.0004423 105 10891937888 80 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.0004001 106 12207589706 77 
Sierra Leone 0.000393 107 164763079 132 
Bahrain 0.00039 108 10907022284 79 
Nicaragua 0.0003883 109 1072833656 120 
Congo 0.0003614 110 7794341422 85 
Kyrgyzstan 0.000357 111 4934313000 91 
Slovenia 0.0003461 112 14435804915 74 
Moldova 0.000346 113 1096879691 119 
Latvia 0.0003449 114 4351943184 95 
Togo 0.0002974 115 283738547 129 
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COUNTRY CINC*  
CINC 
RANK HWANG **  
HWANG 
RANK 
 Macedonia 0.0002899 116 4024288752 96 
Albania 0.0002759 117 3654277291 99 
Estonia 0.0002528 118 11556915170 78 
Mongolia 0.0002492 119 3524162851 101 
Papua New Guinea 0.0002366 120 3833365616 98 
Liberia 0.0002231 121 81601837 136 
Central African Republic 0.0002061 122 145088409 134 
GAS Cyprus 0.0002019 123 3300184068 104 
Jamaica 0.0001915 124 881013204 123 
Botswana 0.0001868 125 1781228750 115 
Namibia 0.0001794 126 1043716034 121 
Gabon 0.0001527 127 9138902194 81 
Brunei Darussalam 0.0001447 128 14141361533 75 
Montenegro 0.0001332 129 1292862098 117 
Timor-Leste 0.0001131 130 2805685492 109 
Lesotho 0.0000976 131 261722077 130 
Fiji 0.0000812 132 770719840 125 
Guyana 0.0000492 133 174246426 131 
Malta 0.0000345 134 807815921 124 
Cape Verde 0.0000221 135 155422141 133 
Belize 0.0000207 136 120671725 135 
Seychelles 0.00000377 137 67433204 137 
* Source (Correlates of War) 
** Source (Hwang, New Thinking in Measuring National Power, 2008)  
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Appendix E. Complete List of Raw Results of CINCmilpow and Hwangmilpow 
Indexes 
COUNTRY 𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
RANK 𝑯𝒘𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
𝑯𝒘𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
RANK 
United States 0.48337 1 10.613 1 
China 0.15524 2 5.241 2 
Russian Federation 0.07358 3 0.742 3 
India 0.07060 4 0.246 6 
France 0.04820 5 0.406 4 
United Kingdom 0.04313 6 0.174 10 
Japan 0.04192 7 0.278 5 
North Korea 0.03869 8 0.010 126 
South Korea 0.03843 9 0.144 12 
Saudi Arabia 0.03676 10 0.237 7 
Germany 0.03368 11 0.226 8 
Brazil 0.03052 12 0.102 16 
Italy 0.02964 13 0.117 13 
Pakistan 0.02342 14 0.056 43 
Iran 0.02308 15 0.059 38 
Turkey 0.02141 16 0.092 19 
Egypt 0.01765 17 0.047 53 
Canada 0.01680 18 0.097 17 
Australia 0.01643 19 0.108 15 
Viet Nam 0.01619 20 0.036 65 
Thailand 0.01609 21 0.038 62 
Colombia 0.01568 22 0.075 27 
Israel 0.01530 23 0.182 9 
Indonesia 0.01301 24 0.029 75 
Spain 0.01296 25 0.066 32 
Iraq 0.01241 26 0.075 25 
Mexico 0.01222 27 0.021 92 
Syrian Arab Republic 0.01202 28 0.072 28 
United Arab Emirates 0.01181 29 0.144 11 
Greece 0.01045 30 0.068 30 
Algeria 0.00989 31 0.089 20 
Poland 0.00900 32 0.078 24 
Netherlands 0.00890 33 0.061 36 
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COUNTRY 𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
RANK 𝑯𝒘𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
𝑯𝒘𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
RANK 
Morocco 0.00831 34 0.054 46 
Singapore 0.00758 35 0.086 22 
Chile 0.00662 36 0.086 21 
Ukraine 0.00655 37 0.095 18 
Argentina 0.00619 38 0.019 97 
Malaysia 0.00617 39 0.037 63 
Sri Lanka 0.00606 40 0.049 51 
Bangladesh 0.00591 41 0.020 95 
Afghanistan 0.00576 42 0.038 59 
Venezuela 0.00567 43 0.016 109 
Angola 0.00551 44 0.045 54 
Philippines 0.00526 45 0.022 88 
Norway 0.00526 46 0.057 42 
South Africa 0.00505 47 0.045 55 
Congo (Dem. Rep.) 0.00499 48 0.015 117 
Peru 0.00491 49 0.025 83 
Ethiopia 0.00461 50 0.014 119 
Belgium 0.00449 51 0.038 60 
Sweden 0.00419 52 0.058 40 
Cambodia 0.00411 53 0.018 105 
Portugal 0.00410 54 0.053 47 
Jordan 0.00406 55 0.085 23 
Nigeria 0.00397 56 0.015 115 
Oman 0.00395 57 0.108 14 
Azerbaijan 0.00392 58 0.075 26 
Kuwait 0.00378 59 0.062 35 
Denmark 0.00371 60 0.049 50 
Switzerland 0.00363 61 0.036 64 
Romania 0.00359 62 0.030 74 
Ecuador 0.00326 63 0.058 41 
Nepal 0.00323 64 0.018 103 
Finland 0.00304 65 0.049 49 
Cuba 0.00301 66 0.070 29 
Austria 0.00297 67 0.028 79 
Lebanon 0.00295 68 0.067 31 
Qatar 0.00279 69 0.051 48 
Belarus 0.00279 70 0.036 67 
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COUNTRY 𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
RANK 𝑯𝒘𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
𝑯𝒘𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
RANK 
Kazakhstan 0.00262 71 0.023 86 
Czech Republic 0.00200 72 0.035 69 
Dominican Republic 0.00181 73 0.010 130 
Serbia 0.00179 74 0.040 58 
Hungary 0.00176 75 0.027 80 
Armenia 0.00174 76 0.065 34 
Bolivia 0.00168 77 0.022 91 
Uganda 0.00160 78 0.019 98 
Bulgaria 0.00158 79 0.028 77 
Tunisia 0.00152 80 0.023 87 
Georgia 0.00144 81 0.055 45 
New Zealand 0.00130 82 0.032 72 
Uruguay 0.00130 83 0.043 56 
Croatia 0.00125 84 0.035 70 
Slovakia 0.00114 85 0.028 76 
Rwanda 0.00111 86 0.019 100 
Ireland 0.00110 87 0.016 113 
Kenya 0.00110 88 0.019 99 
Tanzania 0.00103 89 0.014 120 
Zimbabwe 0.00102 90 0.010 128 
Chad 0.00096 91 0.023 85 
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 0.00095 92 0.002 137 
Bahrain 0.00082 93 0.065 33 
Zambia 0.00067 94 0.028 78 
Cameroon 0.00066 95 0.017 107 
Slovenia 0.00065 96 0.031 73 
GAS Cyprus 0.00064 97 0.047 52 
El Salvador 0.00063 98 0.016 110 
Guatemala 0.00060 99 0.006 134 
Albania 0.00058 100 0.023 84 
Senegal 0.00056 101 0.020 94 
Ghana 0.00056 102 0.005 135 
Namibia 0.00055 103 0.056 44 
Lithuania 0.00054 104 0.020 93 
Botswana 0.00051 105 0.038 61 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.00050 106 0.026 81 
Honduras 0.00049 107 0.016 111 
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COUNTRY 𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑪𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
RANK 𝑯𝒘𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
𝑯𝒘𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒑𝒐𝒘 
RANK 
Kyrgyzstan 0.00048 108 0.059 39 
Madagascar 0.00047 109 0.010 129 
Paraguay 0.00047 110 0.016 114 
Brunei Darussalam 0.00046 111 0.061 37 
Burkina Faso 0.00044 112 0.017 106 
Nicaragua 0.00042 113 0.010 127 
Congo 0.00041 114 0.013 122 
Estonia 0.00037 115 0.041 57 
Mongolia 0.00037 116 0.016 108 
Latvia 0.00035 117 0.019 101 
Sierra Leone 0.00035 118 0.013 124 
Mali 0.00035 119 0.022 89 
Macedonia 0.00033 120 0.022 90 
Togo 0.00031 121 0.020 96 
Gabon 0.00023 122 0.015 116 
Moldova  0.00020 123 0.005 136 
Niger 0.00020 124 0.010 131 
Jamaica 0.00016 125 0.013 123 
Montenegro 0.00015 126 0.036 66 
Fiji 0.00014 127 0.016 112 
Papua New Guinea 0.00013 128 0.006 133 
Central African Republic 0.00011 129 0.025 82 
Malta 0.00010 130 0.014 121 
Lesotho 0.00010 131 0.032 71 
Liberia 0.00008 132 0.015 118 
Timor-Leste 0.00006 133 0.035 68 
Guyana 0.00005 134 0.019 102 
Cape Verde 0.00004 135 0.009 132 
Belize 0.00004 136 0.012 125 
Seychelles 0.00001 137 0.018 104 
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Appendix F. Complete List of Defense R&D Data 
COUNTRY RANK 
DEFENSE R&D 
DATA ($) 
SHARE OF THE 
WORLD TOTAL 
ESTIMATED-0 
KNOWN-1 
United States 1 83,193,000,000.00 0.691869519 1 
China 2 15,000,000,000.00 0.124746587 1 
France 3 4,157,193,447.60 0.034573046 1 
Russian Federation 4 3,600,000,000.00 0.029939181 1 
United Kingdom 5 3,361,961,822.80 0.027959551 1 
Israel 6 2,471,140,857.98 0.020551092 0 
Germany 7 1,689,225,624.66 0.014048342 1 
South Korea 8 1,600,000,000.00 0.013306303 1 
India 9 1,300,000,000.00 0.010811371 1 
Japan 10 1,000,000,000.00 0.008316439 1 
Singapore 11 605,072,278.28 0.005032047 0 
Brazil 12 438,200,150.12 0.003644265 0 
Australia 13 242,700,000.00 0.002018400 1 
Canada 14 201,600,000.00 0.001676594 1 
Spain 15 188,188,483.27 0.001565058 1 
Turkey 16 146,275,609.27 0.001216492 1 
Poland 17 140,763,963.61 0.001170655 1 
Sweden 18 123,961,005.74 0.001030914 1 
Norway 19 121,928,858.10 0.001014014 1 
Iran 20 91,258,765.90 0.000758948 0 
Netherlands 21 86,790,122.42 0.000721785 1 
Italy 22 74,597,236.61 0.000620383 1 
Ukraine 23 57,670,051.48 0.000479609 0 
Finland 24 44,440,165.71 0.000369584 1 
Ireland 25 34,407,406.19 0.000286147 0 
Pakistan 26 26,641,290.91 0.000221561 0 
Czech Republic 27 23,410,340.76 0.000194691 1 
South Africa 28 17,560,000.00 0.000146037 1 
Argentina 29 16,367,418.23 0.000136119 0 
Tunisia 30 16,325,272.25 0.000135768 0 
Switzerland 31 15,095,953.86 0.000125545 1 
Serbia 32 14,547,644.80 0.000120985 0 
Denmark 33 13,934,726.64 0.000115887 1 
Chile 34 12,163,857.33 0.000101160 0 
Greece 35 12,111,599.90 0.000100725 1 
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COUNTRY RANK 
DEFENSE R&D 
DATA ($) 
SHARE OF THE 
WORLD TOTAL 
ESTIMATED-0 
KNOWN-1 
Mexico 36 11,302,969.37 0.000094000 0 
Belgium 37 10,683,290.42 0.000088847 1 
Slovenia 38 9,011,123.23 0.000074940 1 
Croatia 39 8,841,044.28 0.000073526 0 
Portugal 40 8,105,366.00 0.000067408 1 
Belarus 41 6,984,039.21 0.000058082 0 
Bulgaria 42 6,285,128.69 0.000052270 0 
Lithuania 43 4,381,662.06 0.000036440 0 
Saudi Arabia 44 4,215,559.90 0.000035058 0 
Thailand 45 4,185,017.73 0.000034804 0 
Egypt 46 4,182,081.41 0.000034780 0 
Colombia 47 3,885,384.02 0.000032313 0 
Jordan 48 2,920,936.84 0.000024292 0 
Ecuador 49 2,637,820.45 0.000021937 0 
Romania 50 2,461,801.71 0.000020473 1 
Uruguay 51 2,454,066.12 0.000020409 0 
Azerbaijan 52 1,570,613.95 0.000013062 0 
GAS Cyprus 53 1,219,046.26 0.000010138 0 
Austria 54 1,161,227.22 0.000009657 1 
Uganda 55 1,078,657.30 0.000008971 0 
Kazakhstan 56 1,053,255.28 0.000008759 0 
Estonia 57 859,308.14 0.000007146 1 
Gabon 58 773,374.18 0.000006432 0 
Kuwait 59 580,927.04 0.000004831 0 
Armenia 60 503,758.29 0.000004189 0 
Philippines 61 491,046.48 0.000004084 0 
Senegal 62 482,583.47 0.000004013 0 
Indonesia 63 468,160.46 0.000003893 0 
Sri Lanka 64 362,437.59 0.000003014 0 
Zambia 65 338,153.08 0.000002812 0 
Ethiopia 66 319,373.14 0.000002656 0 
Hungary 67 290,306.81 0.000002414 1 
Malta 68 265,384.89 0.000002207 0 
Macedonia 69 156,412.10 0.000001301 0 
Kyrgyzstan 70 135,761.75 0.000001129 0 
Slovakia 71 116,122.72 0.000000966 1 
Burkina Faso 72 102,029.64 0.000000849 0 
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COUNTRY RANK 
DEFENSE R&D 
DATA ($) 
SHARE OF THE 
WORLD TOTAL 
ESTIMATED-0 
KNOWN-1 
Albania 73 97,560.03 0.000000811 0 
Moldova  74 84,476.72 0.000000703 0 
Mongolia 75 66,617.61 0.000000554 0 
El Salvador 76 37,212.07 0.000000309 0 
Latvia 77 34,836.82 0.000000290 1 
Madagascar 78 29,774.94 0.000000248 0 
Paraguay 79 9,535.26 0.000000079 0 
Guatemala 80 9,022.82 0.000000075 0 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 81 1,838.29 0.000000015 0 
Lesotho 82 878.51 0.000000007 0 
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Appendix G. Complete List of Results of Technological Spillover Indexes 
COUNTRY 
TECHNOLOGICAL 
SPILLOVER INDEX RANK 
United States 0.18384388 1 
China 0.10538958 2 
Japan 0.09758488 3 
South Korea 0.04988763 4 
Germany 0.04094510 5 
United Kingdom 0.03577937 6 
Canada 0.02857774 7 
France 0.02695104 8 
Australia 0.02254537 9 
Russian Federation 0.02219928 10 
Finland 0.02064598 11 
Denmark 0.01784690 12 
Singapore 0.01726406 13 
Italy 0.01711301 14 
Sweden 0.01679087 15 
Spain 0.01647052 16 
Norway 0.01519572 17 
India 0.01480387 18 
Netherlands 0.01366050 19 
New Zealand 0.01295407 20 
Switzerland 0.01288726 21 
Austria 0.01272514 22 
Belgium 0.01191012 23 
Portugal 0.01182449 24 
Brazil 0.01106121 25 
Slovenia 0.00934880 26 
Ireland 0.00931389 27 
Czech Republic 0.00856946 28 
Poland 0.00844668 29 
Estonia 0.00781105 30 
Greece 0.00663789 31 
Slovakia 0.00646538 32 
Lithuania 0.00629579 33 
Hungary 0.00619222 34 
Turkey 0.00596503 35 
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COUNTRY 
TECHNOLOGICAL 
SPILLOVER INDEX RANK 
Ukraine 0.00548257 36 
Mexico 0.00545463 37 
Argentina 0.00490199 38 
Tunisia 0.00482222 39 
Croatia 0.00441578 40 
Bulgaria 0.00433416 41 
Israel 0.00407253 42 
Latvia 0.00392313 43 
Iran 0.00388496 44 
South Africa 0.00355426 45 
Romania 0.00338917 46 
Serbia 0.00284119 47 
Malta 0.00278583 48 
Egypt 0.00241113 49 
Malaysia 0.00220474 50 
Morocco 0.00206296 51 
Thailand 0.00202983 52 
Moldova  0.00195261 53 
GAS Cyprus 0.00188732 54 
Chile 0.00181801 55 
North Korea 0.00151018 56 
Pakistan 0.00129957 57 
Macedonia 0.00125274 58 
Colombia 0.00110178 59 
Uruguay 0.00107337 60 
Philippines 0.00096530 61 
Senegal 0.00096435 62 
Viet Nam 0.00084058 63 
Saudi Arabia 0.00078665 64 
Venezuela  0.00075340 65 
Belarus 0.00065600 66 
Nigeria 0.00055932 67 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.00052406 68 
Kuwait 0.00052123 69 
Ecuador 0.00043089 70 
Algeria 0.00042967 71 
Albania 0.00042967 72 
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COUNTRY 
TECHNOLOGICAL 
SPILLOVER INDEX RANK 
Indonesia 0.00042591 73 
Sri Lanka 0.00040597 74 
Kenya 0.00036535 75 
Cuba 0.00033374 76 
Jordan 0.00031571 77 
Bangladesh 0.00027720 78 
Paraguay 0.00025457 79 
United Arab Emirates 0.00020867 80 
Guatemala 0.00018105 81 
Iraq 0.00017545 82 
Peru 0.00015564 83 
Lebanon 0.00015515 84 
Georgia 0.00015152 85 
Burkina Faso 0.00014436 86 
Madagascar 0.00014283 87 
Ethiopia 0.00013784 88 
Armenia 0.00013344 89 
Zambia 0.00013223 90 
Azerbaijan 0.00012372 91 
Ghana 0.00011629 92 
Togo 0.00010154 93 
Kazakhstan 0.00009455 94 
Tanzania  0.00009252 95 
Oman 0.00009139 96 
Cameroon 0.00008673 97 
Uganda 0.00008342 98 
Nepal 0.00006769 99 
Zimbabwe 0.00006362 100 
Qatar 0.00005846 101 
Mongolia 0.00005616 102 
Lesotho 0.00005386 103 
Syrian Arab Republic 0.00004492 104 
Jamaica 0.00004077 105 
Botswana 0.00004064 106 
Montenegro 0.00003912 107 
Bahrain 0.00003745 108 
Rwanda 0.00003744 109 
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COUNTRY 
TECHNOLOGICAL 
SPILLOVER INDEX RANK 
Kyrgyzstan 0.00003722 110 
Bolivia 0.00003055 111 
Papua New Guinea 0.00002911 112 
Congo 0.00002262 113 
Brunei Darussalam 0.00002195 114 
Mali 0.00002001 115 
Gabon 0.00001779 116 
Fiji 0.00001755 117 
Cambodia 0.00001723 118 
Namibia 0.00001679 119 
Niger 0.00001402 120 
Belize 0.00001268 121 
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 0.00001134 122 
Nicaragua 0.00001087 123 
El Salvador 0.00001021 124 
Dominican Republic 0.00000806 125 
Honduras 0.00000791 126 
Afghanistan 0.00000501 127 
Angola 0.00000463 128 
Central African Republic 0.00000455 129 
Guyana 0.00000447 130 
Seychelles 0.00000372 131 
Sierra Leone 0.00000372 132 
Congo (Dem. Rep.) 0.00000371 133 
Chad 0.00000322 134 
Liberia 0.00000125 135 
Cape Verde 0.00000093 136 
Timor-Leste 0.00000044 137 
  
69 
 
References 
Agresti, A. (2010). Analysis of Ordinal Categorical Data. New Jersey: John  
Wiley&Sons. 
 
Anderson, R. S. (2006). Maximizing Benefit From Defense Research. Ministry of  
 
Defense UK. 
 
Arena, P. (2012, November 13). Once More on Military Capability. 
 
Beckman, P. R. (1984). World Politics in the Twentieth Century. Prentice-Hall.  
 
Englewod Cliffs  
 
Braddon, D. (1999). Commercial Applications of Military R&D: U.S. and E.U. Programs  
 
Compared. Bristol, U.K. 
 
Brzoska, M. (2005). Retrieved December 30, 2012, from http://www.ifsh.de/pdf/aktuelles  
 
/india_brzoska.pdf 
 
Cateni, S., Colla, V., & Vannucci, M. (2008). Outlier Detection Methods for Industrial.  
 
In J. A. Trevino, Advances in Robotics, Automation and Control (p. 272).  
 
Retrieved from http://www.intechopen.com/books/advances_in_robotic  
 
_automation_and_control/outlier_detection_methods_for_industrial_applications 
 
CIA. (2010). The World Factbook. Retrieved February 20, 2013, from Central  
 
Intelligence Agency (US): https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- 
 
factbook/fields/2173.html 
 
Cline, R. S. (1975). World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Draft. Westview  
 
Press. 
 
Correlates of War. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/  
 
Capabilities/NMC_v4_0.csv 
70 
 
Dunne, J. P., & Braddon, D. (2008). Economic impact of military R&D. Flemish Peace  
 
Institute. 
Friedensburg, F. (1936). Raw Materials as Political and Military Power Factors.  
 
Stuttgart. 
 
GAO. (1972). Comparison of Military Research and Development Expenditures of The  
 
United States and The Soviet Union.  
 
GAO. (1986). Measuring Military Capability: Progress, Problems and Future Direction.  
 
Washington,DC: United States General Accounting Office. 
 
Global Firepower. (2013, January 19). Retrieved from http://www.globalfirepower.com/ 
 
Hamdy, H. A. (2010, December). State versus society in Egypt: Consolidating democracy  
 
or upgrading autocracy. African Journal of Political Science and International  
 
Relations, pp. 319-329. 
 
Hartley, K. (2006, June). Defence R&D: Data Issues. Defence and Peace Economics, pp.  
 
169–175. doi:10.1080/10242690600645027 
 
Hartley, K. (2010). The Economics of Defence Policy: A New Perspective. London:  
 
Routledge. 
 
Hartley, K. (2011). Defence R&D Spending: A Critical Review of the Economic Data.  
 
World Economics, pp. 103-114. 
 
Hoffman, N. v. (2008, January 9). The Nation Magazine. Retrieved January 4, 2013, from  
 
http://www.thenation.com/article/coming-terms-huckabee 
 
Höhn, K. (2011). Four Early Attempts to Develop Power Formulas (1741-1955).  
 
Hwang, K. (2008). New Thinking in Measuring National Power. WISC Second Global  
 
International Studies Conference. Ljubljana, Slovenia. 
 
71 
 
Hwang, K. (2010). Measuring Geopolitical Power in India: A Review of the National  
 
Security Index (NSI). Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies.  
 
Retrieved from http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content  
 
/publikationen/pdf/wp136_hwang.pdf 
 
James, A. D. (2004). U.S. Defence R&D Spending: An Analysis of the Impacts.  
 
Manchester, UK: PREST University of Manchester. 
 
Kurtoglu, H., & Agdemir, M. A. (2001). An Assessment of Turkish Defense Industry and  
 
Turkey's Efforts to Transfer Military Technology: Strategies for Arming the  
 
Future. Monterey,CA: Naval Postgraduate School. Retrieved November 25, 2012 
 
Marshall, A. (1966). Problems of Estimating Military Power. Santa Monica, California:  
 
The RAND Corporation. 
 
Motte, J. d. (1992). The Revision of International Science Indicators: The Frascati  
 
Manual. Technology in Society, 427-440. 
 
Nazar, N. (2007). Involvement of Military in Indonesian Politics. Asia Pacific: A  
 
Research Journal of Far East & South East Asia, pp. 75-89. 
 
OECD. (2002). Frascati Manual: Proposed Standard Practice for Surveys on Research  
 
and Experimental Development. Retrieved November 18, 2012, from  
 
http://www.tubitak.gov.tr/tubitak_content_files/BTYPD/kilavuzlar/Frascati.pdf 
 
Organski, A., & Kugler, J. (1978, July). Davids and Goliaths Predicting the Outcomes of  
 
International Wars. Comparative Political Studies, pp. 141-180. 
 
Peled, D. (2001). Defense R&D and Economic Growth in Israel:A Research Agenda.  
 
Paper, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa. 
 
Pillsbury, M. (2000). China Debates the Future Security Environment. Washington:  
72 
 
National Defense University Press. Retrieved from https://www.fas.org/nuke/  
 
guide/china/doctrine/pills2/ 
 
Power Index. (2006). Retrieved January 6, 2013, from German Institute of Global and  
 
Area Studies: http://www.giga-hamburg.de/english/content/rpn/strategy/pdf/  
 
power_index.pdf 
 
Prasetya, D. M. (2012). Defensive Strategy of China in response to the U.S. policy on  
 
Taiwan. Journal of Studies in International Relations, pp. 51-65. 
 
Quandt, W. B. (1981). Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security, and Oil.  
 
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 
 
SCImago. (2007). SJR-SCImago Journal & Country Rank. Retrieved February 13, 2013,  
 
from http://www.scimagojr.com/ 
 
Silhan, V. (2012, December 31). Comparisons of Military Power. Economics and  
 
Management, pp. 112-121. 
 
Singer, J. D. (1987). Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material  
 
Capabilities of States, 1816-1985. International Interactions, 115-132. 
 
Singer, J. D., Bremer, S., & Stuckey, J. (1972). Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and  
 
Major Power War, 1820-1965. In B. Russett, Peace, War and Numbers (pp. 19- 
 
48). Beverly Hills: Sage. 
 
Sköns, S. E., Loose-Weintraub, E., Omitoogun, W., Stalenheim, P., & Weidacher, R.  
 
(2001). Military Expenditure and Arms Production. Oxford: Oxford University  
 
Press. 
 
Thee, M. (1990). Science-based Military Technology as a Driving Force behind The  
 
Arms Race. In N. Gleditsch, & O. Njolstad, Arms Race: Technological and  
73 
 
Political Dynamic. London: Sage Publications. 
 
Wright, P. Q. (1955). The Study of International Relations. New York. 
 
Zedalis, R. J. (2007). Iraqi Oil and Revenues from Its Sale: A Review of How Existing  
 
Security Council Resolutions Affected the Past and May Shape the Future. The  
 
European Journal of International Law, pp. 499-522. doi:10.1093/ejil/chm026 
 
  
74 
 
Vita 
 First Lieutenant Cihan OKUR started undergraduate studies at the Turkish Air 
Force Academy in Istanbul and graduated as a Lieutenant with a Bachelor’s degree in 
Industrial Engineering in 2005.  
 During his Air Force career, Cihan was assigned to 4th Main Jet Base Command, 
11th Air Transportation Main Base Command, and General Staff Electronic Systems 
(GES) Command, respectively.  In 2009, he served in European Union Forces (EUFOR) 
mission in Sarajevo, Bosnia for six months. In 2011, he started his graduate education in 
Graduate School of Engineering and Management at Air Force Institute and Technology 
(AFIT).  Upon graduation, his assignment will be in the Turkish Air Force Headquarters, 
Ankara.  
75 
 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 
Form Approved 
OMB No. 074-0188 
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments 
regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of the collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, 
Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA  
22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to an penalty for failing to comply with a 
collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.  
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 
21-03-2013 
2. REPORT TYPE  
Master’s Thesis  
3. DATES COVERED (From – To) 
September 2011 – March 2013 
TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
 
The Effect of Defense R&D on Military Capability and 
Technological Spillover 
5a.  CONTRACT NUMBER 
5b.  GRANT NUMBER 
 
5c.  PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 
6.  AUTHOR(S) 
 
Okur, Cihan, First Lieutenant, TURAF 
5d.  PROJECT NUMBER 
 
5e.  TASK NUMBER 
5f.  WORK UNIT NUMBER 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S) 
  Air Force Institute of Technology 
 Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/ENV) 
 2950 Hobson Way, Building 640 
 WPAFB OH 45433-8865 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
    REPORT NUMBER 
 
     AFIT-ENV-13-M-20 
9.  SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
 
Intentionally left blank 
  
 
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S 
ACRONYM(S) 
 
11.  SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT 
NUMBER(S) 
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  Distribution Statement A: 
     APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED. 
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  
14. ABSTRACT  
Generally, the purpose of defense research and development (R&D) is to expand military capability for the 
armed forces of a country.  Any spin-off of technologies from defense R&D programs is usually not a prime 
motivation but more often an unintended consequence.  Nevertheless, many of the technologies used in civilian life 
were initially research and development projects for military purposes.  These technologies eventually become 
adapted to civilian applications since they had beneficial economic and social ''spillover'' effects.  However, there is 
a lack of research measuring the final outputs of defense R&D, including technology ''spin-offs.'' 
This study mainly tried to understand the effect of defense R&D expenditures on military capability and 
technological spillover.  Statistical measures such as correlations were used to understand these effects.  The study 
revealed that there is a highly positive correlation between defense R&D expenditure and military capability, as well 
as between defense R&D expenditure and technological spillover index.  
                The study contributed to the academic literature in three ways by providing: new measures of military 
capability, a new estimation method for defense R&D expenditures, and a new method to measure technological 
spillover effect from defense R&D expenditures. 
15. SUBJECT TERMS 
Defense R&D, military capability, technological spillover  
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
OF: 
17. LIMITATION 
OF ABSTRACT 
 
 
UU 
18. 
NUMBER  
OF PAGES 
 
86 
19a.  NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON 
Dr. Alfred E. Thal (ENV) 
a. 
REPORT 
 
U 
b. 
ABSTRACT 
 
U 
c. THIS 
PAGE 
 
U 
19b.  TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) 
(937) 255-3636, ext 7401 (al.thal@afit.edu) 
   Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18 
 
